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Using an adjusted Glosten-Milgrom model, I show that, theoretically, adver-
tising can increase information asymmetry in the financial markets. Using
high frequency intra-day tick data surrounding Super Bowl Commercials, I
then show, empirically, that advertising positively affects informed trading
and reduces information efficiency. Moreover, it has a negative impact on
stock liquidity. Advertising changes the buy-sell imbalance of different trade
size groups, generating more large sell orders, which indicates that institu-
tional investors are net sellers. I also find that there is a decline in cumulative




Advertising disseminates product or firm information to audiences (Nelson,
1974), and therefore is believed to reduce information asymmetry in the prod-
uct markets (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Considering these audiences can also
include financial market investors, one would expect that product market
advertising has the potential to play an important role in reducing informa-
tion asymmetry among investors and improving information efficiency in the
financial markets.
The impact that advertising has on the financial markets is not, however,
clear-cut. The information contained in advertising may be biased and in-
complete, as advertising is not designed to portray firms objectively (Lou,
2014). Moreover, individual investors are more likely to be affected by
advertising, and most of them are unsophisticated or uninformed (Barber
and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joseph and Wintoki, 2013; Lou, 2014).
Furthermore, advertising can capture investors’ attention and lead to more
attention-driven trading, which inflates short-run stock prices that are then
xvii
often followed by lower future returns (Gervais et al., 2001; Barber and
Odean, 2007).
As advertising may induce increased individual (retail) investor participa-
tion in the market (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joseph and
Wintoki, 2013; Lou, 2014), it it may benefit informed investors at the cost
of uninformed individual investors. This suggests advertising may increase
information asymmetry in the financial markets. Advertising does not di-
rectly contain price-based information on firm value (Joseph and Wintoki,
2013) but it can directly affect stock prices through attention-driven trading
(Barber and Odean, 2007; Gervais et al., 2001). Advertising’s short-run stock
return effect may reduce the stock price efficiency or informativeness when
stock prices deviate from what the fundamentals suggest they should be.
Whether advertising has an impact on the information environment sur-
rounding firms in the financial markets is unclear. In order to answer this,
I examine information asymmetry and information efficiency in the financial
markets, and investigate trading behavior occurring from different kinds of
investors, as advertising is broadcast.
Using an adjusted Glosten-Milgrom model, I show that, theoretically, adver-
tising can increase information asymmetry in the financial markets. Based
on the results from this theoretical model, I develop the hypothesis that
advertising may facilitate informed trading in the financial markets. I use
an event study research method to test this hypothesis by tracking changes
xviii
in informed trading around the event window. Using data on Super Bowl
Commercials and high frequency intra-day trading, I show that advertising
increases informed trading of stocks whose names are readily identifiable from
the content of their adverting.
Furthermore, I investigate whether advertising can improve stocks’ infor-
mation efficiency, measured as the speed with which the market impounds
information into prices. Again, using data on Super Bowl Commercials and
high frequency intraday trading around game days from 2008 to 2018, I show
that firms whose names are readily identifiable from the content of advertis-
ing experience a decrease in their information efficiency, accompanied by an
increase in informed trading of their stock and a decrease in their cumulative
abnormal return around the event window.
Moreover, I study the magnitude and direction of trading from informed
institutional investors. I examine the hypothesis that advertising results in
more sell orders from institutional investors. By applying t-tests and non-
parametric tests to the buy-sell imbalance of large size orders, I find that for
firms whose names are recognizable from the content of advertising, there
is a reduced buy-sell imbalance for large size orders on the day after the
advertising event. This result indicates that institutional investors sell more
than they buy after an advertising event.
I also investigate advertising’s impact on short-run returns and liquidity. Us-
ing the results from t-tests and non-parametric tests, I show advertised firms
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exhibit a decline in cumulative abnormal returns. Modified Fama-Mecbeth
regressions further show that the decrease in cumulative abnormal returns is
correlated with increased informed trading. I also find that advertised firms
experience a decline in stock liquidity following an advertising event. This
result is not consistent with early studies showing that advertising improves
stock liquidity due to increased trading from retail investors.
My study provides evidence on the relationship between advertising and
firm’s financial market information environment, and in particular on the
level of informed trading and information efficiency after firm advertising is
broadcast. This study also sheds light on the literature investigating the
impacts of advertising on short-run abnormal return, stock liquidity, and the





My research intends to examine advertising’s impact on financial market
outcomes. First, I investigate whether advertising can reduce information
asymmetry among investors in financial markets, both theoretically and em-
pirically. Second, I examine whether advertising can improve the informa-
tional efficiency of advertising firms with respect to their securities in the
financial markets. Third, I analyze the influence of advertising on investor
trading behavior, with a particular focus on the buy-sell imbalance among in-
stitutional investors. Last, I study whether advertising increases firms’ short




In the product markets, advertising can benefit the firms by increasing sales,
maintaining the consumer loyalty, expand the consumer base, etc. Moreover,
advertising can increase the brand presence, enhance the brand awareness,
and create a favorable image of the firms, which may also increase the firms’
visibility in the financial markets. The increased firms’ visibility in the fi-
nancial markets can attract investors attention, and investors attention can
influence their investment decisions (Barber and Odean, 2007). Therefore,
advertising can affect firms’ stock price directly.
Firm managers are aware of the effect of advertising on stock price when
making their advertising decisions. They may use advertising for the purpose
of influencing the stock price, and some of them may opportunistically adjust
the advertising expense to exploit the temporary return effect to their own
benefit when stock price matters the most (Luo, 2008; Lou, 2014).
However, advertising has its side effects in the financial markets, which is
little known in the literature. First, in influencing the short-run stock prices,
advertising may cause a loss to some investors, especially the retail investors.
Advertising influences retail (individual) investors more than it does insti-
tutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joshi and
Hanssens, 2010a ; Lou, 2014). Individual investors being net buyers of such
attention-grabbing stocks ( Fehle et al., 2005 ; Lou, 2014 ), they make their in-
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vestment decisions in part based on familiarity rather than fundamental value
or portfolio theory. They may evaluate the firm values over-optimistically and
buy stocks at prices higher than their fundamental value, suffering a loss in
trading with more informed investors. Second, if advertising can influence
the short-run stock price, it may increase the volatility as well, and then
results in the mis-pricing. One important function of the financial markets is
to incorporate information into stock price, making the price to reflect infor-
mation timely and effectively. If advertising can cause the price inefficiency,
it may not a good signal in investors’ decision making.
Marketing decision makers and investors are increasingly aware of the impor-
tance of advertising’s side effects in the financial markets, which calls for an
evaluation of the short-term effects of advertising on information asymmetry,
and information efficiency, and investor response.
Advertising plays an important role in both product markets and financial
markets. In product markets, it conveys product information to audiences,
(Nelson, 1974), making products better known to consumers and potential
consumers. Therefore, advertising is believed to reduce information asym-
metry in product markets (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Given that advertising
is public information in product markets, and is also visible in the financial
markets, there is potential for it to play an important role in disseminating
value-relevant information to broad groups of investors. Some firm managers
use advertising as a communication channel to provide new product infor-
mation and show their financial wellbeing to both current and prospective
3
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investors (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009). Therefore, one may think advertis-
ing has an impact on the information environment in financial markets. A
firm’s financial market information environment includes both information
asymmetry and information efficiency. Information asymmetry among mar-
ket participants refers to some investors, possessing firm-specific information
related to the fundamental value of the security that is not accessible to
uninformed investors. As a type of market failure, information asymmetry
can lead to a series of problems in financial markets (Akerlof, 1970), such
as adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Glosten and Harris, 1988), illiquidity
(Stoll, 1989), mispricing (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), and higher cost of
capital (Easley and O’hara, 2004). Information efficiency is the speed and
effectiveness with which information is incorporated into price. According to
Malkiel and Fama (1970), a market is efficient if value-related information
is reflected in stock prices fully and timely. Incorporating information into
prices - termed price efficiency - is a fundamental important function of fi-
nancial markets. Lower levels of information efficiency can pose problems for
investors attempting to value firms correctly and in a timely manner.
However, the information contained in advertising may be biased and in-
complete. Advertising is not designed to portray commodities or firms in
an objective manner (Lou, 2014), and does not directly contain price-based
information on firm value and advertising investment productivity (Joseph
and Wintoki, 2013). While researchers and managers focus on advertising’s
role for investor communication, little is known about advertising’s impact
on information asymmetry and information efficiency in financial markets.
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Whether advertising will reduce information risk and improve information
efficiency in financial markets is an empirical question that has been unan-
swered so far in the literature.
The impact of product market advertising on firm value, stock price, and in-
vestors’ trading behavior in financial markets has been analyzed extensively
in the marketing and finance literature. Advertising can directly affect firm
value, especially short-run stock returns, by means of advertising-induced
investor behavioral bias. Advertising can capture investors’ attention (Fehle
et al., 2005, Lou, 2014), and affecting investors’ behavior by generating a fa-
miliarity bias in in stock picking or by influencing investors to evaluate firms
more optimistically (Barber and Odean, 2007). The attention-driven trad-
ing that results from advertising can directly inflate short-term stock prices
(Gervais et al., 2001; Barber and Odean, 2007). However, advertising’s effect
on short-run return may not be beneficial for all investors. Prior research find
that advertising influences retail (individual) investors more than it does in-
stitutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joshi and
Hanssens, 2010a ; Lou, 2014). Informed investors typically rely on more
information resources, are unlikely to consider stocks purely based on atten-
tion grabbing advertising, while uninformed investors often trade stocks for
reasons unrelated to stock fundamentals such as attention. However, prior
research focuses on advertising’s impact on individual investors, neglecting
the different reactions and performance between individual investors and in-
stitutions after advertising is broadcast. For example, advertising may not
inflate stock prices. Moreover, it may induce more large size sell orders from
5
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institutional investors, resulting in poor performance of individual investors.
Advertising’s differing impacts on reactions and performance of individual
and institutional investors are not fully understood. The extant literature
examining the this issue is sparse.
1.3 Brief Results and Contribution
In Chapter 2, I first briefly describe the original Glosten-Milgrom model.
I then extend the Glosten-Milgrom model of dealer markets by regarding
advertising as a signal that will result in more buying from retail investors.
Using this modified Glosten-Milgrom model, I prove that theoretically, adver-
tising may temporally increase information asymmetry in financial markets.
In Chapter 3, I develop hypotheses based on results from the theoretical
model and test them with an event study research method. I exploit Super
Bowl Commercials as events of interest in this research. I find that firm’s in-
formation environments in financial markets are significantly and negatively
related to a term that captures advertising events. The post-event Monday
experiences a reduced return, lower information efficiency, and increased in-
formed trading, indicating that advertising facilitates informed trading and
reduces the informational efficiency of stocks in financial markets. This effect
is more pronounced for firms whose names are recognizable from the content
of advertising. These firms also experience a significantly decrease in buy-
6
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sell imbalance among large size orders, defined as orders larger than $30,000.
This indicates there are more large sell orders after the event, likely submitted
by institutional investors. I also find advertised firms exhibit a decline in liq-
uidity after an advertising event. This result is inconsistent with prior studies
showing that advertising can improve liquidity. Although advertising might
have long-term effects on liquidity, effects which are not linked to improved
liquidity directly following advertising events. The results from difference in
differences regressions provide further evidence that advertising may exacer-
bate informed trading and reduce information efficiency, especially for firms
with names that are recognizable from the content of advertising.
This research contributes to several strands of the finance and marketing
literatures.
First, this research improves our understanding of advertising’s financial mar-
kets outcomes including information asymmetry and information efficiency.
Previous research investigates advertising’s impact on information asymme-
try in product markets, or the default view that advertising can reduce in-
formation asymmetry in financial markets. I show, both theoretically and
empirically, that advertising can increase information asymmetry among in-
vestors in financial markets. Furthermore, I also find advertising can reduce
information efficiency for stocks from advertised firms.
Second, my research adds to the growing literature on advertising-induced
trading in financial markets. Prior work focuses largely on the trading pat-
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terns of individual investors. My main contribution is to study the different
reactions and performance between individual and institutional investors.
More specifically, for individual investors, my research investigates the po-
tential risk that they are facing in trading attention-grabbing securities. I
find that advertising leads to higher information asymmetry between unin-
formed and informed investors. This study complements the literature on
trading behaviour from different kinds of investors on the background that
the cut-off rule does not work.
Third, prior studies typically rely on annual advertising expenditure and fo-
cus on the contemporaneous low-frequency financial market outcomes. By us-
ing an event study method together with high-frequency intra-day tick data,
this paper contributes to the literature on advertising’s immediate short-run
effect in financial markets. While the event study method helps me to iso-
late an account for any potential reverse causality and some endogeneity
concerns, high frequency data allows me to better capture any potential im-
pact of advertising on investors’ reactions and financial markets outcomes,
which is pivotal since attention after advertising tends to fade quickly.
Finally, by studying the effect of advertising on information asymmetry and
information efficiency in financial markets, this paper sheds light on research
of market microstructure theory in the context of marketing activities and
their financial market outcomes.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses my theoret-
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ical model development. Chapter 3 presents the empirical analyses, including
a summary of the research design, description of the sample and its summary







In this chapter I introduce a theoretical model to investigate the relation-
ship between advertising and information asymmetry among informed and
uninformed investors in financial markets. First, I briefly introduce the orig-
inal Glosten-Milgrom model. Following this, I extend the Glosten-Milgrom
model of dealer markets by regarding advertising as a signal that result in
more buying from retail investors.
In the original Glosten-Milgrom model, there are two kinds of investors trad-
ing with market makers. In trading with informed investors, market makers
11
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require a compensation to offset their potential losses. The compensation
that market makers required is the bid-ask spread (adverse selection compo-
nent), which is the benchmark measure in this chapter.
Advertising may indicate to investors that firms are financially well-being, or
at least less risky. It can be utilized as a signal to influence investors decision
making. I modify the Glosten-Milgrom model by regarding advertising as a
signal that results in more buy orders from some uninformed investors who
do not have access to private information about firm value. They have to
evaluate signals to make their investment decisions among available options.
In the adjusted Glosten-Milgrom model, I assume that uninformed investors
can be divided into two groups: the signal sensitive uninformed investors
and the signal insensitive uninformed investors. Advertising, as a signal, can
influence signal sensitive uninformed investors to submit buy orders when
observing the signal. Market makers adjust their bid-ask spread according to
the changed order directions. I compare the bid-ask spread (adverse selection
component) in the adjusted Glosten-Milgrom model with the benchmark and
then theoretically prove that advertising increases information asymmetry
among informed and uninformed investors.
Product market advertising is believed to have an impact on investors’ trad-
ing behaviour and on their investment decisions in financial markets, espe-
cially for retail investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005). Ad-
vertising influences investors’ behaviour by attracting their attention (Barber
and Odean, 2007; Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005), and by disseminating
12
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value-relevant information to broad groups of investors (Chemmanur and
Yan, 2009). This increase firm visibility, changes the trading price, volume
and order imbalance, and also enlarges the investor base, increases stock
liquidity (Grullon et al., 2004; Barber and Odean, 2007; Frieder and Subrah-
manyam, 2005). Given advertising’s impact on investor attention and stock
prices, some firm managers may potentially use it not only as a communica-
tion channel for providing new product information but also as a means to
demonstrate their financially wellbeing to investors or future investors. They
may increase advertising expenses prior to IPOs, SEOs, or during other pe-
riod that stock prices matter most (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009; Fehle et al.,
2005; Luo, 2008). However, in doing so, such managers may be unaware of
advertising’s side effects in the financial markets.
Advertising conveys product information to audiences, (Nelson, 1974),makes
products better known to consumers and potential consumers, and is there-
fore believed to reduce information asymmetry in product markets (Kirmani
and Rao, 2000). Considering that a product market advertising is also visi-
ble to the financial markets, advertising may affect information asymmetry
in the financial markets as well. Grullon et al. (2004) assume that adver-
tising reduces the information asymmetry in financial markets and therefore
increases the liquidity of stocks. Chemmanur and Yan (2009) and Luo (2008)
claim that advertising can reduce information asymmetry prior to IPOs be-
cause advertising may help to signal and provide information about the true
value of the firm to investors.
13
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However, most advertising portrays the underlying product or firms in a
way that neither comprehensive nor objective (Lou, 2014). The information
contained in advertising may be biased and incomplete as advertising is not
designed to portray a commodity or firm in an objective manner (Lou, 2014),
and it does not directly contain price-based information on firm value and
advertising investment productivity (Joseph and Wintoki, 2013). Advertis-
ing affects investor’s trading via familiarity bias. It biases some investors’
decisions in favor of familiarity rather than fundamental values. Besides,
advertising influences retail (individual) investors more than it does insti-
tutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joshi and
Hanssens, 2010a ; Lou, 2014), as institutional investors already have infor-
mational advantages and their investment decisions are unlikely to be affected
by advertising. Individual investors do not have access to private informa-
tion about firm values, so their investment decisions are more likely affected
by brand awareness, familiarity and attention. Such individual investors are
likely to be uninformed (Grullon et al., 2004), and be net buyers of atten-
tion grabbing stocks ( Fehle et al., 2005 Lou, 2014 ). Moreover, advertising
can increase short run stock returns, but this is a temporary effect, which is
followed by lower future returns (Lou, 2014). This effect is also called price
overreaction or price overshooting. This suggests that investors influenced
by advertising may be misguided and buy securities at a price higher than
the fundamental value and hence that they might suffer losses trading such
attention grabbing securities.
The mechanism by which advertising affects the information asymmetry can
14
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be briefly illustrated as follows. After a company increase its advertising
exposure, there will be more individual investors trading in its stock. These
individual investors are net buyers of securities from heavily advertised firms.
They make investment decisions based on familiarity rather than fundamen-
tal firm values or portfolio theories. They may evaluate firm values over-
optimistically and buy stocks at prices higher than their fundamental values,
suffering losses in trading with more informed investors. Informed investors
who have private access to value-related information will buy when stock
prices are lower than their fundamental values and sell otherwise. They
trade more aggressively when the market is more liquid.
As a consequence, advertising may mislead uninformed retail investors, widen
the information gap between informed and uninformed investors, and leads to
higher information asymmetry in financial markets. Information asymmetry
among market participants refers to some investors, possessing firm-specific
information related to the fundamental value of the security, who build po-
sitions on private information that is not accessible to uninformed investors.
As a type of market failure, information asymmetry can lead to a series of
problems in the financial markets (Akerlof, 1970), such as adverse selection
(Akerlof, 1970; Glosten and Harris, 1988), illiquidity (Stoll, 1989), mispricing
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), and higher cost of capital (Easley and O’hara,
2004).
The extant literature examining the above issue is sparse. The relation-
ship between advertising and information asymmetry is unclear and there is
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limited research examining the magnitude and direction of the impact that
advertising can have on information asymmetry in the financial markets.
2.2 The Original Glosten-Milgrom Model
In this section, I briefly describe the original Glosten-Milgrom model and
discuss a micro-marketstructure measure of information asymmetry.
In financial markets, information asymmetry among informed and unin-
formed investors can be measured by the adverse selection cost of the bid-ask
spread. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) find that bid-ask spreads consist of 3
primary components: adverse selection cost, order processing cost and in-
ventory cost. They present an econometric model to estimate the adverse
selection component of the bid-ask spread and this model is widely used in
research on information asymmetry and liquidity.
The bid-ask spread is the difference between the ask and bid prices of a
security in the market and can be considered a measure of the supply and
demand for a particular asset. The ask price is the lowest sell price that
sellers are willing to accept and bid price is the highest buy price that buyers
are willing to pay. The bid-ask spread is required from liquidity suppliers
to cover their potential costs and risks. Some of the key elements to the
bid-ask spread include information asymmetry, the cost of executing orders
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and maintaining a presence in the market, and the risk of variations in the
value of their positions(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Accordingly, the bid-
ask spread can be decomposed into three components: adverse selection cost,
order processing cost, and inventory cost (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). The
adverse selection cost is a compensation required by dealers to offset their
potential losses on trades with informed investors (Foucault et al., 2013).
The Glosten-Milgrom model analyzes the bid-ask spread from market makers
facing both privately informed and uninformed traders. In particular, this
model is employed to analyze information asymmetry among investors by
decomposing the bid-ask spread and calculating the adverse selection com-
ponent.
2.2.1 Assumptions
In analyzing information asymmetry in the financial markets, the assump-
tions for the Glosten-Milgrom model can be described as follows:
1. No other costs: There are no order processing costs or inventory costs
so that the bid-ask spread equals the adverse selection cost.
2. Security values: A security’s future value (transaction price in the next
trade) has a binary distribution. It can take v = V H or v = V L,
where V H denotes the transaction price going up and V L denotes the
17
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transaction price going down.
3. Trade size: The trade size is normalized to one. An investor has only
one single trading opportunity. Therefore, the probability that an or-
der comes from an informed (or uninformed) investors is equal to the
proportion of informed (or uninformed) investors in the market.
4. Market participants:
• Informed investors, have private information about future firm
values. They will buy a security if the price goes up (v = V H )
and sell a security if the price goes down (v = V L ). Orders are
placed by informed investors with probability π, which equals the
proportion of informed investors among all investors.
• Uninformed investors do not have access to information about
future firm values. They place random orders, buys and sells each
with probability 50%. Orders are placed by uninformed investors
with probability 1−π, which equals the proportion of uninformed
investors among all investors.
5. Market makers:
• Market makers include liquidity suppliers and include a pool of
traders who may be individuals need cash, or fund managers who
have to invest a recent cash flow or re-balance the portfolio. They
are liquidity suppliers in the financial markets.
• Orders convey information and order direction is the sole source of
18
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new information for market makers, based upon on which market
makers revise their estimates of the values of securities.
Before observing the (t + 1)th order, the market makers estimate
of the security’s value is
µt = θtv
H + (1− θt)vL,
where θt and (1 − θt) are the probabilities that market makers
assign to the occurrence of high (vH), and low (vL) values respec-
tively.
• Market makers require a larger bid-ask spread to compensate for
their potential losses on trades with more informed investors.
6. Market clearing condition: The market is in equilibrium when market
makers make zero expected profits.
2.2.2 The Determinants of the Bid-ask Spread
The or bid-ask spread can be computed by looking at the market clearing
condition. By setting the market maker’s expected profit with all investors
equal to zero and solving the subsequence equation, one can compute the




The market maker’s expected profit from trading with informed investors at
the ask price at is given by:
θt−1π · (at − vH),
where π is the proportion of informed traders, θt−1 is the market makers’
belief about the value of the security, and vH is a security’s higher value.
The market maker’s expected profit from trading with uninformed investors
at the ask price at is given by:
1
2
(1− π) · (at − µt−1),
where π is the proportion of informed traders, θt−1 is market maker’s belief
about the value of the security, and µt−1 is the mid quote.
The market equilibrium condition at the ask price at becomes:
θt−1π · (at − vH) +
1
2
(1− π) · (at − µt−1) = 0,
where π is the proportion of informed traders, θt−1 is market maker’s belief
about the value of the security, and vH is a security’s higher value.
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Solving this equation, we get the competitive ask price at time t:














where π is the proportion of informed traders, θt−1 is market maker’s belief
about the value of the security, and vH − vL is volatility of security’s value.
By the same method, we can also compute the competitive bid price at time
t.
The market markers expected profit from trading with informed investors at
the bid price bt is given by:
(1− θt−1)π · (vL − bt).
The market markers expected profit from trading with uninformed investors
at the bid price bt is given by:
1
2
(1− π) · (µt−1 − bt).
The market equilibrium condition at the bid price bt therefore becomes:
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(1− θt−1)π · (vL − bt) +
1
2
(1− π) · (µt−1 − bt) = 0.
Solving this equation, we get the competitive bid price at time t:
bt = µt−1 −
π(1− θt−1)




π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)
(vH − vL)
Therefore, the bid-ask spread (adverse selection component) at time t is:
St ≡ at − bt
= πθt−1(1− θt−1)(
1
πθt−1 + (1− π)12
+
1
π(1− θt−1) + (1− π)12
)(vH − vL),
(2.1)
where π is the proportion of informed traders, θt−1 is market maker’s belief
about the value of the security, and vH − vL is the volatility of security’s
value. The bid-ask spread is an increasing function of π and vH − vL, which
means that the spread is larger when there are more informed investors or
greater volatility in the security’s value. With other conditions unchanged,
the spread is greatest when θt−1 =
1
2
, which means market makers are per-
fectly uncertain about the markets direction (when θt−1 = 1, market makers
are very confident the security’s price will go up; when θt−1 = 0, market
makers are very confident the security’s price will go down).
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This function is also the benchmark measure of bid-ask spread with informed
trading in this chapter.
2.3 The Adjusted Glosten-Milgrom Model
I modify the Glosten-Milgrom model to investigate the impact of advertis-
ing’s short-run effect on information asymmetry in financial markets. In the
modified model, advertising is regarded as a signal that can affect the behav-
ior of some uninformed investors and then in turn affect informed trading.
First, I illustrate the assumptions about advertising’s short-run price impact
and investors behavior. Second, I introduce a simplified two-step model to
illustrate how advertising can affect informed trading in two time periods.
Last, I extend the simplified two-step model into three steps, which align
closely with reality.
2.3.1 Assumptions
1. Short-run price impact: I assume advertising has a positive short-run




2. Informed investors: Informed investors are not only aware of advertis-
ing’s effect but also the expected response from other investors. They
submit buy orders using the private information about the price going
up and submit sell orders after that. The probability that an order
comes from informed investors is π, which is equal to the proportion of
informed investors.
3. Uninformed investors: Uninformed investors do not have access to pri-
vate information about the value of securities. In the presence of un-
certainty, some of them will evaluate signals to make their investment
decisions among available options. I divide the uninformed investors
into two groups, the signal sensitive uninformed investors and the sig-
nal insensitive uninformed investors. I assume that advertising can
affect signal sensitive uninformed investors such that they will submit
buy orders when observing advertising and submit random orders oth-
erwise. Signal insensitive uninformed investors submit random orders
(50% buy orders and 50% sell orders). The probability that an order
comes from signal sensitive uninformed investors is (1−π)δ, while that
from signal insensitive uninformed investors is (1 − π)(1 − δ). The
(1 − π) is equal to the proportion of uninformed investors, and δ is




2.3.2 A Two-Step Model
To show how advertising affects information asymmetry in financial markets,
I introduce a simplified two-step model first. I assume there are two time
periods and advertising is visible in the second one. Then, I compute the
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread in this two-step model by
the market clear conditions and then compare it with that in the benchmark
model. Advertising will increase information asymmetry among informed
and uninformed investors if the adverse selection component of the bid-ask
spread is greater than that in the benchmark model.
At time t − 1, there is no advertising or private information in financial
markets. In the absence of informed trading, the order flow is balanced, with
50 percent buy and 50 percent sell orders. Uninformed investors are equally
likely to buy a security as they are to sell it. The informed investors do
not trade as the price will not change in the next period. The dealers are




At time t, advertising is observed by investors. Informed investors have
private information that the price will go up in the next step. Signal sensitive
uninformed investors’ portfolio decision making is affected by the signal.
Signal insensitive uninformed investors are not affected by the signal. Thus,
the informed investors and signal sensitive uninformed investors in the market
will submit buy orders while signal insensitive uninformed investors submit
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random orders. Market makers receive more buy orders and based on that
they revise their value estimation. Through this channel, advertising can
affect the parameter θt, which is the probability that dealers assign to the




Transaction Trader identity Joint probability Conditional value
Buyers at at
Informed πθt−1 v = v
H
Informed 0 v = vL
Signal insensitive uninformed 1
2
(1− π)(1− δ) µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed (1− π)δθt−1 µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed (1− π)δ(1− θt−1) µt−1
Sellers at bt
informed 0 v = vH
informed π(1− θt−1) v = vL
Signal insensitive uninformed 1
2
(1− π)(1− δ) µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed 0 µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed 0 µt−1
Market makers’ expected net profit from the transaction at the ask price at
is:
πθt−1(at − vH) +
1
2
(1− π)(1− δ)(at − µt−1) + (1− π)δ(at − µt−1).




π(1− θt−1)(vL − bt) +
1
2
(1− π)(1− δ)(µt−1 − bt).
As the market is assumed to be competitive, the bid and ask prices will be
such that the dealer’s expected net profit equals zero. I let these formulas
equal zero and solve the subsequent equations, where the bid and ask prices















(1− π)(1 + δ)
= µt−1 +









(1− π)(1− δ)µt−1 + π(1− θt−1)vL
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
= µt−1 −
π(1− θt−1)(µt−1 − vL)
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
= µt−1 −
πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
.
Given that advertising will result in more buy orders from both informed in-
vestors and signal sensitive uninformed investors, the adverse selection com-
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ponent in the bid-ask spread with more buy orders at time t is:
St = at − bt
=




(1− π)(1 + δ)
+
πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
=
πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
[π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)][πθt−1 +
1
2
(1− π)(1 + δ)]
(2.2)
In this two-step model, θt−1 is assumed to be equal to
1
2
, so that equation
(2.2) equals:
St = π(v
H − vL) · 1
[π + (1− π)(1− δ)][π + (1− π)(1 + δ)]
= π(vH − vL) · 1
[1 + δ(π − 1)][1− δ(π − 1)]
= π(vH − vL) · 1
1− [δ(π − 1)]2
It is obvious that 1− [δ(π − 1)]2 < 1, so we have:
St > π(v
H − vL).
In the benchmark model, I let θt−1 =
1
2
, such that the adverse selection







This two-step model therefore proves that advertising can increase informa-
tion asymmetry in financial markets .
2.3.3 The Three-Step Model
In this part, I extend the two-step model into three steps, which is closer to
the reality. There are three time periods in this model, and I denote them
as t − 2, t − 1, and t. Advertising is visible in the second time period. I
compute the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread in this three-
step model using the market clearing condition and then compare that result
with benchmark model. Advertising increases information asymmetry among
informed and uninformed investors if the adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread is greater than that in the benchmark model.
At time t − 2, there is no advertising or private information in financial
markets. In the absence of informed trading, the order flow is balanced, with
50 percent buy and 50 percent sell orders. Dealers are perfectly uncertain




At time t− 1, advertising has not yet been observed by investors. However,
informed investors have private information about the upcoming advertising
and its impact on short run stock prices. They submit buy orders while
uninformed investors (both signal sensitive and signal insensitive uninformed
investors) submit random orders. Market makers receive more buy orders
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from informed investors, based on which they revise their value estimates. In
this way, advertising can affect the parameter θt−1, which is the probability
that dealers assign to future prices going up (v = vH). I prove that θt−1 >
1
2
later. Stock prices go up at this point in time as there are more buy orders
than sell orders.
As advertising only has an effect on informed investors’ trading, the bid-ask
spread at time t− 1 is equal to the benchmark model:
St−1 ≡ at−1 − bt−1
= πθt−2(1− θt−2)(
1
πθt−2 + (1− π)12
+
1






, so the bid-ask spread at time t− 1 equals to:
St−1 = π(v
H − vL).
At time t, advertising is observed by signal sensitive uninformed investors
and they submit buy orders while signal insensitive uninformed investors
submit random orders. The informed investors continue buying as they are
aware of advertising’s short-run price impact.
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Transaction Trader identity Joint probability Conditional value
Buyers at at
Informed πθt−1 v = v
H
Informed 0 v = vL
Signal insensitive uninformed 1
2
(1− π)(1− δ) µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed (1− π)δθt−1 µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed (1− π)δ(1− θt−1) µt−1
Sellers at bt
Informed 0 v = vH
Informed π(1− θt−1) v = vL
Signal insensitive uninformed 1
2
(1− π)(1− δ) µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed 0 µt−1
Signal sensitive uninformed 0 µt−1
Market makers’ expected net profit from the transaction at the ask price at
is:
πθt−1(at − vH) +
1
2
(1− π)(1− δ)(at − µt−1) + (1− π)δ(at − µt−1).
Market makers’ expected net profit from the transaction at the bid price bt
is:
π(1− θt−1)(vL − bt) +
1
2
(1− π)(1− δ)(µt−1 − bt).
As the market is assumed to be competitive, the bid and ask prices will be
such that the dealer’s expected net profit is zero. I let these formulas equal
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(1− π)(1 + δ)
= µt−1 +









(1− π)(1− δ)µt−1 + π(1− θt−1)vL
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
= µt−1 −
π(1− θt−1)(µt−1 − vL)
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
= µt−1 −
πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
.
The adverse selection component in the bid-ask spread with more buy orders
from both informed investors and signal sensitive uninformed investors at
time t is:
St ≡ at − bt
=




(1− π)(1 + δ)
+
πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)
=
πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
[π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)][πθt−1 +
1
2
(1− π)(1 + δ)]
(2.4)
According to the original Glosten-Milgrom model, if advertising does not
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induce more buy orders from retail investors (when the informed investors










πθt−1 + (1− π)12
+
1
π(1− θt−1) + (1− π)12
)(vH − vL).
Taking the difference between the bid-ask spread in this three-step model
and that in the original Glosten-Milgrom model, we have:
St − S
′
t =πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
· { 1
[π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)][πθt−1 +
1
2





(1− π)][π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)]
}
=πθt−1(1− θt−1)(vH − vL)
· { 1
[π(1− θt−1) + 12(1− π)(1− δ)][πθt−1 +
1
2















− [π(1− θt−1) +
1
2
(1− π)(1− δ)][πθt−1 +
1
2
(1− π)(1 + δ)].













− [π(1− θt−1) +
1
2
(1− π)(1− δ)][πθt−1 +
1
2











(1− π)2 − π2θt−1(1− θt−1)−
1
2
π(1− π)(1− θt−1)(1 + δ)
− 1
2




π(1− π) + 1
4
(1− π)2δ2 − 1
2




(1− π)2δ2 + 1
2




(1− π)2δ2 + 1
2
π(1− π)δ(2θt−1 − 1).
When 2θt−1 − 1 > 0(θt−1 > 12) , we get St − S
′
t > 0.
In this adjusted Golsten-Milgrom model, the results depend on the value of
the parameter θt−1, which is the dealer’s belief about the future value of the
security. The value of θt−1 varies over time, as the market maker changes his
value estimate.
Define θ+t−1 as the probability that market makers assign to the occurrence
that prices go up (v = vH) in the wake of a buy order at time t− 1. Define
θ−t−1 as the probability that market makers assign the occurrence that prices
go up (v = vH) after they receive a sell order. Using Bayes’ Theorem, let A
be the event (v = vH) and B be the arrival of a buy order. Then we get:
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The probability of the price going up is Pr(A) = θt−2.
































π(1− θt−2) + 12(1− π)
.





















If we define xt−1 as the cumulative difference between buy and sell orders
up to time t − 1, then the odds ratio can be expressed as a function of the























































1−π > 1, ln(
1+π
1−π ) > 0. Therefore
dθt−1
dxt−1
> 0, and θt−1 is an increasing
function of aggregated order imbalance.
In this three-step model, at the beginning T = t − 2, there are no informed
trades happening and the orders are balanced, θ0 = θt−2 =
1
2
. At time t− 1,
informed investors have private information about advertising and submit
buy orders while the uninformed investors submit random orders, so the
order imbalance xt−1 > 0.




The value of θt−1 is very important in proving St−S
′






t > 0 is therefore proved, which means advertising results in a
larger adverse selection component in the bid-ask spread (more information
asymmetry in financial markets).
The impact of advertising on the adverse selection component in the bid-ask
spread can also be illustrated by the first order conditions. This is done
by taking the first order derivative of the bid-ask spread with respect to
the number of buy orders from signal sensitive uninformed investors at time
T = t. If the first order derivative is greater than zero, a firm with more

























































(1− π)(1 + δ)]2 − [π(1− θt−1) +
1
2
(1− π)(1 + δ)]2
=π2θ2t−1 + π(1− π)(1 + δ)θt−1 +
1
4
(1− π)2(1 + δ)2








=π2(2θt−1 − 1) + π(1− π)[2δ + θt−1(1− δ)] + (1− π)2δ
It is obvious that ∂St
∂δ
> 0 when θt−1 >
1
2
. This indicates that the bid-ask




In the original Glosten-Milgrom model, there are two kinds of investors. In-
formed investors who have private information about the market’s direction,
and submit buy orders when the price is going up and sell orders when the
price is going down, and the uninformed investors who always submit ran-
dom orders. Market makers include a pool of traders who may be individuals
needing cash or fund managers who need to re-balance their portfolios. Their
only source of new information is order direction, based on which they revise
their estimates of securities’ values. In trading with informed investors, mar-
ket makers require compensation to offset their potential losses. As there are
no order processing and inventory costs in this model, the compensation that
market makers require is equal to the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread
(adverse selection component) from the original Glosten-Milgrom model is
the benchmark measure in this chapter.
In the adjusted Glosten-Milgrom model, I assume that advertising will tem-
porarily inflate stock prices and that informed investors are aware of advertis-
ing’s short run price impact. I further assume that the uninformed investors
can be divided into two groups: namely the signal sensitive uninformed in-
vestors and the signal insensitive uninformed investors. The signal sensitive
uninformed investors submit buy orders when they observe advertising and
submit random orders otherwise. The signal insensitive uninformed investors
submit random orders no matter whether they observe advertising or not.
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The two-step model is a special case, where informed investors do not build
their positions before advertising is observed by uninformed investors. Mar-
ket makers receive more buy orders from both informed and signal sensitive
uninformed investors after advertising is visible. Based on this order direc-
tion imbalance, market makers revise their value estimates and change the
bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread in the two-step model is greater than
that in the original Glosten-Milgrom two-step model, which is the bench-
mark measure in this chapter. Therefore, advertising increases information
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors in this model.
The three-step model, where there are three kinds of investors and three
time periods, align more closely with reality. Informed investors have private
information not only about the time that advertising will be observed but
also about the short run price effect of advertising. They submit buy orders
before advertising is observed. After that, both informed investors and signal
sensitive uninformed investors submit buy orders. Based on this imbalanced
order direction, market makers revise their value estimates and change the
bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread in the three-step model is greater than
that in the original Glosten-Milgrom model. Moreover, the bid-ask spread is
positively related to the proportion of signal sensitive uninformed investors
who submit buy orders when observing advertising. In conclusion, theoret-
ically, advertising may temporally increase information asymmetry in the
financial markets.
In this chapter, I assume advertising only has a short run price impact. If I
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extend the three-step model into one with more periods, in step 4, signal sen-
sitive uninformed investors may continue buying but the informed investors
may become net sellers as advertising’s short run price effect dissipates and
prices go down. After that, the signal sensitive uninformed investors will
trade like other uninformed investors, submitting random orders (50% buy
orders and 50% sell orders). In that case, information asymmetry may de-








CHAPTER 3. ADVERTISING’S FINANCIAL MARKET OUTCOMES
3.1 Abstract
Using Super Bowl Commercials as events and by looking at high frequency
intra-day tick data, I investigate a number of advertising’s short-run effects
in the financial markets, including the level of information asymmetry among
investors, information efficiency, buy sell imbalance, stock returns, and stock
liquidity. Based on different information asymmetry and information ef-
ficiency measures, I show that advertising positively affects the informed
trading and reduces information efficiency. Moreover, it has negative impact
on stock liquidity. Advertising changes the buy sell imbalance of different
trade size groups, generating more large sell orders, which may indicate that
institutional investors are net sellers. Advertised firms exhibit a decline in
cumulative abnormal returns, which is correlated to the increased informed
trading.
44
CHAPTER 3. ADVERTISING’S FINANCIAL MARKET OUTCOMES
3.2 Introduction
3.2.1 Objective
My research intends to investigate advertising’s impact on financial market
outcomes at the micro marketstructure level, and especially advertising’s
impact on information asymmetry, information efficiency, liquidity, buy-sell
imbalance, and stock returns.
3.2.2 Motivation
In the product markets, advertising can benefit the firms by increasing sales,
maintaining the consumer loyalty, expand the consumer base, etc. Moreover,
advertising can increase the brand presence, enhance the brand awareness,
and create a favorable image of the firms, which may also increase the firms’
visibility in the financial markets. The increased firms’ visibility in the fi-
nancial markets can attract investors attention, and investors attention can
influence their investment decisions (Barber and Odean, 2007). Therefore,
advertising can affect firms’ stock price directly.
Firm managers are aware of the effect of advertising on stock price when
making their advertising decisions. They may use advertising for the purpose
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of influencing the stock price, and some of them may opportunistically adjust
the advertising expense to exploit the temporary return effect to their own
benefit when stock price matters the most (Luo, 2008; Lou, 2014).
However, advertising has its side effects in the financial markets, which is
little known in the literature. First, in influencing the short-run stock prices,
advertising may cause a loss to some investors, especially the retail investors.
Advertising influences retail (individual) investors more than it does insti-
tutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joshi and
Hanssens, 2010a ; Lou, 2014). Individual investors being net buyers of such
attention-grabbing stocks ( Fehle et al., 2005 ; Lou, 2014 ), they make their in-
vestment decisions in part based on familiarity rather than fundamental value
or portfolio theory. They may evaluate the firm values over-optimistically and
buy stocks at prices higher than their fundamental value, suffering a loss in
trading with more informed investors. Second, if advertising can influence
the short-run stock price, it may increase the volatility as well, and then
results in the mis-pricing. One important function of the financial markets is
to incorporate information into stock price, making the price to reflect infor-
mation timely and effectively. If advertising can cause the price inefficiency,
it may not a good signal in investors’ decision making.
Marketing decision makers and investors are increasingly aware of the impor-
tance of advertising’s side effects in the financial markets, which calls for an
evaluation of the short-term effects of advertising on information asymmetry,
and information efficiency, and investor response.
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Advertising plays an important role in disseminating value-relevant informa-
tion to broad groups of investors. So, firm managers may use advertising as
an potential communication channel providing new product information and
showing their financial wellbeing to investors or future investors (Chemmanur
and Yan, 2009). For this reason, one may expect advertising to ease infor-
mation asymmetry among investors by providing forecasts of the potential
future revenue increases. However, the information contained in advertising
may be biased and incomplete as advertising is not designed to portray firms
objectively (Lou, 2014), and does not directly contain price-based informa-
tion on firm value and advertising investment productivity (Joseph and Win-
toki, 2013). While researchers and managers focus on advertising’s role for
investor communication, little is known about advertising’s impact on firms’
information environment including information asymmetry and information
efficiency in financial markets. More information asymmetry increases the
risks faced by uninformed investors. Institutional investors have more infor-
mation about firm values than others, while retail investors can only rely on
public information and other sources such as advertising when there is uncer-
tainty in the market. These uninformed retail investors risk suffering losses
when trading with more informed investors. Information efficiency measures
the speed with which the market impounds information into prices. A lower
level of information efficiency can pose problems for investors attempting
to value firms correctly and in a timely manner. Given the importance of
these questions, whether advertising will reduce information asymmetry and
improve information efficiency in financial markets is an empirical question
that has been left unanswered so far in the literature.
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The impact of product market advertising on firm value, stock prices, and
investors’ trading in financial markets has been analyzed extensively in the
marketing and finance literature. Beside being able to impact firm values
by increasing their profitability through future sales, advertising can also
directly affect firm value by means of advertising-induced investor behavior
bias. Advertising affects investors’ trading behavior by grabbing their atten-
tion (Barber and Odean, 2007). Advertising can improve a firm’s image and
increase firm visibility, therefore capture investors’ attention (Fehle et al.,
2005, Lou, 2014). Attention affects investment decision making by generat-
ing a familiarity bias which renders investors more likely to evaluate firms
more optimistically (Barber and Odean, 2007). Increased investor attention
from advertising is strong enough to inflate short-term stock prices (Gervais
et al., 2001; Barber and Odean, 2007). If managers are aware of advertis-
ing leading to a short-term attention effect that in turn influences short-run
stock prices, they may wrongly believe that advertising is beneficial for all
investors in improving their investment decision making.
Advertising influences retail (individual) investors more than it does insti-
tutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle et al., 2005; Joshi and
Hanssens, 2010a ; Lou, 2014). With more information resources, informed
investors are unlikely to consider advertising induced attention grabbing
stocks, while uninformed investors often trade stocks for reasons unrelated
to stock fundamentals such as attention. However, prior research focuses
on advertising’s impact on individual investors, neglecting the differing re-
actions and performance between individual and institutional investors after
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advertising is broadcast. Since advertising is a tool to attract investor atten-
tion, some managers may use it to artificially boost stock prices in the short
run without consideration for the side effects of their manipulations. More-
over, advertising may induce more large size sell orders from institutional
investors, resulting in poor investment performance for individual investors.
If individual investors are unaware of the potential problems of attention-
driven trading, they may be falsely led to bid up the stock price and suffer a
loss, while professional investors are less likely to involve in attention-driven
trading. Furthermore, early studies that analyze the trading of individual
investors rely on the cut-off rule to identify whether orders are from indi-
vidual investors or not. However, after 1998, the cut-off rule does not work
since institutional investors use order-splitting techniques to break up their
trades into smaller orders. Kyle (1985) finds that informed investors conceal
their trades into noise trades to avoid the liquidity shortages. The use of
computerized algorithms can not only disguise institutional trades but also
improve the timing of their trades. It allows informed investors to trade more
when uninformed investors’ trading surges and take advantage of uninformed
investors by anticipating their trading. Advertising’s differential impact on
the performance of individual and institutional investors are not yet fully
understood. In particular, little is known about periods where new trading
methods are widely accepted. The extant literature examining the above
issue is sparse.
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3.2.3 Brief Results
I find that a firm’s information environment in the financial markets is sig-
nificantly and negatively related to a term that captures advertising events.
Both the day-by-day panel data regressions and cross-sectional data esti-
mations indicate that my results are robust, advertising facilitates informed
trading and reduces the informational efficiency in the financial markets.
I find that the post-advertising event Monday is associated with reduced
returns, lower information efficiency, and increased informed trading. This
effect is more pronounced for firms whose names are recognizable from the
content of advertising. These firms also experience a significant decrease in
buy-sell order balance among large size orders where large orders are defined
as those exceeding $30,000. This indicates that there is a greater number
of large sell orders after the advertising events, and I argue these are likely
to be submitted by institutional investors. The results from difference in
differences regressions suggest advertised firms experience a drop in liquidity
after an advertising event. These results are inconsistent with prior research
shows advertising can improve liquidity. Although advertising might have
other long-term effects on liquidity, this may not necessarily be linked to the
impacts on liquidity directly following advertising events. The results from
difference in differences regressions provide further evidence that advertising
may exacerbate informed trading and reduce information efficiency, especially
for firms whose names are recognizable from the content of advertising.
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3.2.4 Contribution
This research contributes to several strands of the finance and marketing
literatures.
First, my research adds to the growing literature on behavioral finance, in
particular, the advertising-induced trading in financial markets. Prior work
focuses largely on the trading patterns of individual investors. My main
contribution is to study the different reactions and performance of individ-
ual versus institutional investors. More specifically, for individual investors,
my research investigates the potential risks they facing in trading attention-
grabbing securities. I find that advertising leads to higher information asym-
metry between uninformed and informed investors.
Second, previous research which analyzes trading from individual investors
relies on the cut-off rule to identify orders from individual investors. However,
after 1998, the cut-off rule does not work since institutional investors use
order-splitting techniques to break up their large orders into some smaller
ones. The use of computerized algorithms can not only disguise institutional
trades but also improve the timing of their trades. This study extends the
literature on trading behaviour from different kinds of investors by taking
consideration that the cut-off rule does not work.
Third, prior studies typically rely on annual advertising expenditure and fo-
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cus on the contemporaneous low-frequency financial market outcomes. By us-
ing an event study method together with high-frequency intra-day tick data,
this paper contributes to the literature on advertising’s immediate short-
run effects in the financial markets. Early studies exploit attention-grabbing
events to investigate investors’ trading patterns and financial markets reac-
tions. This research is subject to the criticism that the events of interest may
be relevant to value-related information. While the event study method helps
me to isolate any reverse causality problem and some endogeneity concerns,
high frequency data allows me to better capture any potential impact of ad-
vertising on investors’ reaction and financial market outcomes, since investor
attention after advertising fades quickly.
Finally, by studying the effect of advertising on information risk and infor-
mation efficiency in financial markets, this paper sheds light on research of
market microstructure theory in the context of marketing activities and their
financial market outcomes.
3.3 Literature Review
In this section, I first review the literature on advertising’s impact on short-
run stock returns. Second, I provide a brief overview of attention-driven
trading. Third, I give an overview of investors’ trading patterns, discussed in
conjunction with advertising induced trading. Finally, I discuss the informa-
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tion asymmetry and information efficiency, for they can potentially explain
the impact of advertising on financial market outcomes.
The impact of product market advertising on firm value and stock price has
been analyzed extensively in the marketing and financial literature. Prior
research has found that attention created by advertising influence investors’
portfolio choices, and that in this way, advertising can directly affect firm val-
ues beyond the indirect effect of lifting profitability by increasing future sales
(Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005; Grullon et al., 2004; Joshi and Hanssens,
2010b). Advertising, at least in the short run, can boost a firm’s stock price
(Lou, 2014; Ruenzi et al., 2017). As investors are not necessarily marketing
experts, they may wrongly evaluate the impacts of marketing activities on
stock prices. For example, as argued by Lou (2014), increased advertising ex-
penditure is associated with an increase in abnormal stock returns, but often
followed by lower future returns. Fehle et al. (2005) investigate price reac-
tions and investors’ trading activities for firms employing TV advertisements
during Super Bowl Games and find significant positive abnormal returns for
advertised firms. Being aware of such an effect, firm managers may use
advertising to influence their short run stock prices. Moreover, they may
opportunistically adjust their advertising expenses to exploit the temporary
return effect for their own benefit when stock prices matter most (Luo, 2008;
Lou, 2014).
However, whether advertising inflates the short run stock prices or not can-
not be determined at present. Madsen and Niessner (2014) document that if
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firm’s recent stock price movement have been increases, advertising may trig-
ger downward price pressure. Focke et al. (2018) find that advertising does
not significantly affect short-run stock returns and that previous results of
the positive impact of advertising on stock returns may be resulting from the
reverse causality. Moreover, results about advertising and short-run returns
from prior study are subject to severe endogeneity problems: It is possible
that firms with better sales revenue and profits will increase their advertising
expenditure in the next year, and these firms are also likely to experience
increases in their stock returns in the future.
Advertising’s short-run stock return impact, if any, is believed to go through
the mechanism of attention-driven trading. Heavily advertised securities ap-
pear to be more attractive investment options because advertising has a
significant impact on investors’ attention (Focke et al., 2018). Advertising
can grab investors’ attention by creating a favorable image of the firm and
increasing firm visibility to current and potential future investors. (Fehle
et al., 2005, Lou, 2014). Attention is a scare resource for investors (Kahne-
man, 1973). Attention affects investor behavior by generating a familiarity
bias in which stock investors pick or by rendering investors to evaluate fa-
miliar firms more optimistically when making investment decisions (Barber
and Odean, 2007). Attention gabbing securities have more trading activ-
ity from both individual and institutional investors, have better liquidity
(Grullon et al., 2004), and higher abnormal returns (Gervais et al., 2001; Da
et al., 2011). However, these studies assume both individual and institutional
investors behave similarly in relation to such advertising-induced attention
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grabbing securities, and this may be inconsistent with the literature on in-
formed investors’ trading patterns in the market microstructure area.
Previous research finds that advertising influences retail (individual) investors
more than it does institutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2007; Fehle
et al., 2005; Joshi and Hanssens, 2010a ; Lou, 2014). After a company
increases its advertising exposure, there will be more individual investors
trading in its stock. Individual investors being net buyers of such attention-
grabbing stocks ( Fehle et al., 2005 ; Lou, 2014 ), they make their invest-
ment decisions in part based on familiarity rather than fundamental value or
portfolio theory. They may evaluate the firm values over-optimistically and
buy stocks at prices higher than their fundamental value. Odean (1999) finds
that individual investors often buy stocks that under-perform those they sell,
holding on loser stocks rather than winners. Furthermore, such attention-
driven trading can be bad for unsophisticated investors if they are attracted
to trade more frequently (Peress and Schmidt, 2019). High trading levels re-
sult in poor performance of individual investors (Barber and Odean, 2000).
Their performance may actually be improved by stopping such attention-
driven trading (Peress and Schmidt, 2019). Early studies that analyze the
link between advertising and financial markets focus on the reactions and
trading pattern of individual investors. Research about advertising and in-
stitutional investors’ reactions is sparse and the results are mixed. While
Grullon et al. (2004) argue advertising results in a larger number of both in-
dividual and institutional investors, Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) find
a negative relationship between institutional holdings and brand visibility.
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Grullon et al. (2004) find both individual and institutional investors behave
similarly toward advertised firm’s securities. Based on Bloomberg search ac-
tivity, Focke et al. (2018) find that institutional investors such as Bloomberg
users are also affected by advertising. Prior research about advertising and
institutional investors trading is mixed. Moreover, much of this research
relies on the cut-off rule method to identify trades come from institutional
investors rather than individual investors. However, the cut-off rule has not
worked since early 2000’s because the use of computerized trading algorithms
has enable institution investors to break trades up into some smaller orders
(Campbell et al., 2009), implying therefore that small trade size is not a
reliable proxy for the trades of individual investors.
Besides using advertising to influence short-run stock prices, firm managers
may use advertising as a communication channel to provide new product
information and show that their firms are financially sound to investors or
potential future investors for the purpose of improve the information environ-
ment surrounding their firms in the financial markets. Advertising conveys
product information to consumers (Nelson, 1974) and is regarded as public
information in markets. We have good reasons to believe advertising will
reduce information asymmetry in the product markets (Kirmani and Rao,
2000). Fehle et al. (2005) find firms benefit from advertising campaigns
during the Super Bowl. The results suggest that Super Bowl Commercial
advertising is beneficial communication channel for investors. Considering
product market advertising is also visible to investors in the financial mar-
kets, and that it plays an important role in grabbing investor attention,
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advertising may affect the information environment in financial markets as
well. Markets not only provide liquidity and price discovery, they are also
affected by information asymmetry and information efficiency. Information
asymmetry among market participants refers to some investors, possessing
private firm-specific information related to the fundamental value of the se-
curity that is not accessible to uninformed investors. As a kind of market
failure, information asymmetry can potentially lead to a breakdown in the
functioning of the financial markets (Akerlof, 1970). A rise in information
asymmetry will result in illiquidity, and adverse selection. Grullon et al.
(2004) assume advertising may reduce the level of information asymmetry in
financial markets and therefore increase the liquidity of stocks. Grullon et al.
(2004) also find that securities from firms with greater advertising have better
liquidity measured by bid-ask spreads, price impacts, and depth. They as-
sume that increased advertising by a firm will decrease adverse selection costs
and thereby improve market liquidity. However, they regard it as a given,
providing neither theoretical nor empirical evidence that increased advertis-
ing reduces asymmetric information (adverse selection costs) and increase
stock liquidity. Moreover, they say little about whether stock liquidity will
decrease if advertising increases information asymmetry. Chemmanur and
Yan (2009) and Luo (2008) claim that advertising can reduce information
asymmetry prior to IPOs because advertising can help signal or provide in-
formation about the true value of the firm to investors. However, advertising
may also increase information asymmetry in financial markets. Using in-
sider gains as a proxy of information asymmetry, Joseph and Wintoki (2013)
document that information asymmetry is greater for firms with more adver-
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tising investments because advertising investments constitute a significant
fraction of firm expenditures and insiders have information advantage with
regard to firm investment plans and their productivity. However, in examin-
ing advertising’s impact on information asymmetry in the financial markets,
the authors only regard advertising as investment while ignoring advertis-
ing’s potential financial market impact. Rinallo and Basuroy (2009) exploit
media coverage as a measure of information asymmetry to examine the re-
lationship between advertising spending and information asymmetry in the
fashion industry. They find that marketing might affect information asym-
metry. However, their study only focuses on one specific industry and their
measure of information asymmetry is a lower frequency measure. Questions
around advertising’s impact on information asymmetry and informed trading
remain largely unanswered and there is a pressing need for more research on
this.
Advertising affects investors’ attention (Focke et al., 2018; Fehle et al., 2005;
Lou, 2014; Barber and Odean, 2000), and attention is regarded as one source
of changes in the short-horizon financial markets information environment
(Vozlyublennaia, 2014). So, we have good reason to believe advertising has
an impact on the informational efficiency of stock prices in the financial
markets. According to Malkiel and Fama (1970), a market is efficient if in-
formation is fully reflected in stock prices. Incorporating information into
prices is a fundamentally important function of financial markets (i.e. price
discovery). Information efficiency is the speed and effectiveness with which
information is incorporated into prices. When the observed stock price ac-
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curately reflects more private information, firms are closer to being priced at
their intrinsic value. Therefore, increasing information efficiency can reduce
information asymmetry, promote efficient investment decisions, and improve
(uninformed) investors performance (Edmans et al., 2017). Otherwise, de-
creased information efficiency may result in more information asymmetry and
mispricing (Chordia et al., 2008). In financial markets, information efficiency
depends on the information completeness and symmetry, and investors reac-
tions to information releases (Busse and Green, 2002; Edmans et al., 2017;
Chordia et al., 2008; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) document that more information leads to more informative prices
and therefore also increases information efficiency. However, the informa-
tion contained in advertising may be biased and incomplete as advertising is
not designed to portray firms objectively (Lou, 2014), and does not directly
contain price-relevant information on firm value and advertising investment
productivity (Joseph and Wintoki, 2013). So, whether advertising improves
information efficiency remains unclear.
3.4 Hypotheses Development
In the last chapter, I develop a theoretical model and prove that advertising
can increase the information asymmetry in the financial markets due to the
advertising induced attention-driven buying from individual investors. Based
on the results from the theoretical model, I propose the central hypothesis in
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this research is: Advertising has a positive effect on information asymmetry
(informed trading) and a negative effect on information efficiency in financial
markets.
In investigating advertising’s short-run effect on financial markets outcomes,
I exploit Super Bowl Commercials as events of interest. The advertising
induced attention-driven buying is more likely to happen for firms with names
more recognizable from the content of advertising. For the event window, I
expect market reactions following Super Bowl Commercial advertising to be
more pronounced for firms whose names are recognizable from the content
of advertising than for other firms.
I use the event study research method to investigate advertising’s impact
on financial market outcomes. I first examine advertising’s event effect by
comparing financial market outcomes and investor reactions in the event
window relative to their equivalents in a control period. If advertising can
impact investors’ trading behavior and change the information asymmetry
and information efficiency in the financial markets, there should be a signif-
icant difference of financial market outcomes between event window and the
control period.
I then study the informed trading and price discovery processes. I assume
that, at the begining, advertising leads to a surge in retail buying for the
stocks from advertised firms in the financial markets. The reason is that
advertising can attract investors’ attention and attention can influence in-
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vestor’s portfolio choice, especially for the retail investors. Then, the in-
creased buy orders from retail investors can inflate the stock price and im-
prove stock liquidity. The informed (institutional) investors have information
advantage about the advertising induced buying in the financial markets. If
the retail investors are the net buyer of the stocks from advertised firms, then
the institutional investors will be the net seller. The institutional investors
sell the stocks when their prices are higher than the fundamentals. They sell
more when the markets are more liquid. Therefore, I expect advertising has
an impact on buy-sell imbalance, stock prices, and stock liquidity. Moreover,
if the institutional investors are trading with their information advantage
about advertising induced attention-driven buying from retail investors, ad-
vertising can affect the information asymmetry as well. Advertising leads to
more irrational buying from retail investors, which can affect the information
efficiency in the financial markets.
I expect more informed trading in the event window relative to the control
period. I also hypothesize that advertising changes the buy-sell balance,
generating more sell orders from informed investors (institutional investors),
which is subsequently accompanied by a decrease in short run returns. Fol-
lowing these arguments, I formally state my hypotheses as follows:
• H1: Super Bowl Game Commercial advertising has no event effect on
financial market outcomes and investors’ reactions.
• H2: Advertising has a positive impact on stock returns in financial
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markets.
• H3: Advertising has a positive impact on stock liquidity in financial
markets.
• H4: Advertising changes the buy-sell balance, generating more sell or-
ders from informed investors (institutional investors), which is accom-
panied by a decrease in short run returns.
• H5: Advertising can increase information asymmetry between informed
and uninformed investors in financial markets.
• H6: Advertising can improve the information efficiency of a firm’s stock
in financial markets.
3.5 Sample and Data
3.5.1 Sample Selection
In this section, I first describe the event data I use, which includes about
162 firm-year events. I then introduce the high-frequency tick data and low-
frequency data I use for control variables.
My initial advertising sample is selected from Super Bowl Commercial videos
over the 2008-2018 period. Advertising by private firms or foreign companies
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is excluded. Then, I obtain information about the product and company
name for each commercial. The sample is categorized as to whether the
advertised firm’s name is recognizable from the commercial or not. It is
composed of 162 firm-events, where 81 firm names are recognizable from the
advertising and 81 firm names are not. I only include observations in my
final sample if they have high-frequency intra-day tick data available. This
filtering reduces my sample size.
Table 3.1 presents the composition of my sample, which is comprised of 162
firm-events. All firms are categorized as to whether their firm’s name was
recognizable from the advertising or not.
Table 3.1: Sample Distribution
Year No. Samples Recognized Unrecognized
2008 10 5 5
2009 7 4 3
2010 15 8 7
2011 14 9 5
2012 10 5 5
2013 15 6 9
2014 15 7 8
2015 16 8 8
2016 20 7 13
2017 22 12 10
2019 18 10 8
63
CHAPTER 3. ADVERTISING’S FINANCIAL MARKET OUTCOMES
3.5.2 Data
I compile data from several sources. High frequency trading data are collected
from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. This database
offers global intra-day millisecond time-stamped Sales, Quotes, and Market
Depth content for more than five million equities from about 250 stock ex-
changes worldwide since 1996. I collect tick data at the millisecond level
including for trade time, trade price, quotes, and trade volume for all 162
firms in my sample (advertised firms). In order to ensure the integrity of
the dataset, I exploit a number of filters. I examine all trades executed both
on the NYSE and NASDAQ exchange. To account for abnormal trading
patterns and procedures around the start and close of each day, I exclude
after-market hours trading and all trading activity which happens within the
first 15 minutes after the markets open and within the last 15 minutes before
the markets close. Hence, only trades and quotes occurring between 9:45
a.m. and 15:45 p.m. are examined. I also delete all transactions where the
bid price, ask price, bid size, or ask size is listed as zero. Finally I eliminate
all transactions where the transaction price lies outside the bid ask spread
or where the transaction price differs from the previous one by more than 10
percent.
My low-frequency data, on total assets, capital, prior year advertising ex-
penses, BM ratio, leverage, institutional ownership, and the number of an-
alysts following a stock, are obtained from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT
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databases.
3.6 Methodology
In this section, I first describe the event study method. I then introduce
the propensity score (PS) matching method used to construct the control or
matched samples. I also introduce the data processing which I apply to my
trade and size classification. Finally, I define all variables.
3.6.1 Event Study
In this paper I aim to improve our understanding of how advertising affects
firm financial market outcomes. To that end, I use an event study methodol-
ogy. The event study methodology allows me to investigate the investor
reactions and financial market outcomes in a quasi-experimental setting,
where various information proxies, trade variables, and liquidity measures
are tracked around time windows surrounding the focal events. The focal
events in this study are Super Bowl Commercials, which absorb the atten-
tion of wide audiences including investors and potential investors. Given
that most Super Bowl Commercials are pre-announced and typically do not
convey new fundamental information, these advertising events should not
affect fundamental firm values, allowing me to isolate the effect of advertis-
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ing on the information environment and investors’ reactions within financial
markets.
Since the Super Bowl is scheduled on a Sunday in each February, I set
the event window to be the post-game Monday each year. I then exam-
ine investors behavior and financial markets outcomes on post-event Mon-
day. Brennan et al. (2018) use a window covering the period (-20, -1), while
Baruch et al. (2017) use an event window (-5, -1) and control window (-20,
-10). I use the (-20, -1) time periods as my pre-event window and (1,20)
as my post-event window in this research. The estimation window includes
both the pre-event and post-event periods, centered on the post event Mon-
day, allowing me to neutralize any trend in the data. The results are robust
if the estimation window only includes the pre-event period.
3.6.2 Propensity Score Matching for the Control Group
I exploit propensity score matching (PSM) to investigate advertising event’s
impact on financial market outcomes of advertised firms relative to firms that
did not run the advertising campaigns during the Super Bowl. The PSM is a
statistical matching technique introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
This method is regarded as being able to mimic some of the particular aspects
of a randomized controlled trial by matching samples on their propensity
scores with regard to a number of characteristics other than the treatment.
It can therefore reduce treatment assignment bias when estimates of effects
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are generated by comparing treated and untreated subjects in a matched
sample. I select the matched sample from NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms
that belong to the same industry and have similar firm size as the treated
firms that run advertising campaigns during the Super Bowl. I use 1 to 4
matching and then delete firms whose high-frequency tick data is unavailable
from the TRTH database.
3.6.3 Trade Classification
In order to compute the number of buys and sells and therefore also the
market micro structure level financial market outcomes, I need to capture
the direction of each trade. The Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is the most
common classifier used to identify an order as market buy or market sell.
This trade classification algorithm involves two steps. The first step is to
compute the midquote of the bid and ask quotes at the same point in time
(millisecond level). The second step is to compare the midquote with the
transaction price by either quote or tick test. When the transaction price
is not equal to the midquote, a trade is classified as buyer-initiated (seller-
initiated) if the price is above (below) the midquote, with this called the
quote test. When the transaction price is equal to the midquote, a trade is
classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the transaction price is above
(below) the previous price, with this called the tick test.
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3.6.4 Size Classification
Prior research relies on the cut-off rule to classify trades are placed by indi-
vidual or institutional investors. However, the cut-off no longer works since
early 2000’s because institutional investors use computerized trading algo-
rithms to break up their larger trades into smaller orders (Campbell et al.,
2009), this implies that small trade size is not a reliable proxy for individual
investors’ trading activity. Campbell et al. (2009) present a method to infer
daily institutional flows with high frequency intra-day data. They find that
orders where trade value is larger than $30,000 or below $2,000 are likely to
have the same direction as institutional investors’ orders, while orders where
trade value is between $2,000 and $30,000 are associated with investors’ trad-
ing in the opposite direction to institutional flows. I follow the results from
Campbell et al. (2009) and classify all trades into 3 bins of different size:
below $2,000, between $2,000 and $30,000, and larger than $30,000. Then I
compute the buy-sell imbalance for each bin and compare these to infer the
trade direction stemming from institutional investors.
3.6.5 Variable Construction
PIN: The probability of informed trading (PIN), which can be computed
from direction identified high frequency intra-day trading data, is employed
as the measure of information asymmetry. After every trade is classified
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either as buyer or as seller initiated, PIN is computed according to Easley
et al. (2002). PIN utilizes information from the trading process to capture
the probability of informed trading in a stock. It is widely used as a proxy of
information asymmetry or the private information content reflected in stock
prices.
Suppose trades can come from uninformed investors or from informed in-
vestors, and that the daily arrival rates of uninformed investors that submit
buy and sell orders are denoted εb and εs respectively. The arrival rate of
informed investors is εi when an information event occurs. Suppose in one
day, no information event occurs with probability (1−α), a good information
event occurs with probability α(1 − δ), and a bad information event occurs
with probability αδ.
Information Probability Buyers Sellers
Bad news (1− α)(1− δ) εb εs + εi
Good news (1− α)δ εb + εi εs
No news (1− α) εb εs
The likelihood of observing B buy orders and S sell orders conditional on a
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The likelihood of observing B buy orders and S sell orders conditional on a
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Therefore,let θ = {εb, εs, α, δ, εi}, the unconditional probability of B buy
orders and S sell orders in a single trading day is given by:
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Then, PIN for a given stock on a given day can be shown to be:
PIN =
αεi
εb + εs + αεi
.
AutocorrelFactor: AutocorrelFactor is an information efficiency measure of
short-term return predictability. It can be computed by calculating first-
order return autocorrelations for each stock-day, at various intra-day fre-
quencies, k ∈ {10sec, 30sec, 60sec}, and by taking their absolute values:
Autocorrelationk = |Corr(rk,t, rk,t−1)|,
where rk,t is the t − th midquote return of length k for a stock-day. To
compute the combined autocorrelation measure, AutocorrelFactor. I take
the first principal component of the absolute autocorrelations at the three
frequencies. This variable is computed as in Hendershott and Jones (2005).
AutocorrelFactor measures short term return predictability, with larger val-
ues indicating greater inefficiency.
StdevFactor: StdevFactor is a standard deviation factor, an information
efficiency measure of short-term midquote volatility. It is computed by cal-
culating intra-day midquote return standard deviations for each stock-day,
again at various intraday frequencies, k ∈ {10sec, 30sec, 60sec}:
Stdevk = σk,t.
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This is a measure of short-term volatility and a proxy for noise and tempo-
rary deviations of prices from their equilibrium values due to trading frictions
(O’Hara and Ye, 2011). Larger StdevFactor values indicate greater ineffi-
ciency.
Delay: Delay is a measure of the extent to which lagged market returns
predict a stock’s midquote returns (Hou and Moskowitz, 2005). First, for
each stock-day, I estimate a regression of 1-minute midquote returns for stock
i, ri,t, on the index return, rm,t, and ten lags:




and then save the R2 from the above unconstrained regression. Second, I
re-estimate the regression constraining the coefficients on the lagged market
returns to zero and again save the R2. Delay is then calculated as 1 minus
the ratio of the constrained and unconstrained regression R2s:





Then I normalize the value of Delay to be between 0 and 100. The value of
Delay indicates the degree to which incorporation of market-wide informa-
tion into prices is delayed. Hence, a larger value of Delay indicates greater
market inefficiency.
In financial markets, information asymmetry can affect stock returns, liq-
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uidity, and investors compositions (e.g., Grullon et al., 2004). Therefore,
I compute the time-weighted bid-ask spread and Amihud illiquidity as a
liquidity measure and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as my return
measure. I obtain institutional holdings data from the CRSP database to
measure changes of investors compositions.
Different kinds of the bid-ask spread: Bid-ask spread is widely used as a
liquidity measure. I use the following three kinds of bid-ask spread to measure
the liquidity of a security.
QuotedSpread = (Ask −Bid)/midquote,
EffectiveSpread = 2 · direction · [(price−midquote)/midquote],
RealizedSpread = 2 · direction · [(price−midquote5m)/midquote],
where −midquote5m is the midquote five minutes after the trade.
Buy-sell imbalance is a ratio that the excess of buy or sell orders relative
to total number of orders for a specific security. It is computed by dividing
the order imbalance by the total number of orders for a security in a specific
time period:
BSratio = (N buys−N sells)/(N buys+N sells),
where N buys is the number of buy orders and N sells is the number of sell
orders.
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Amihud illiquidity: Amihud (2002) defines the liquidity of stock i in month









where i is stock, d is day, t is month, Daysit is the number of observation days,
Ritd is the return and V
i
td is the trading dollar volume. This measure denotes
the price impact scaled by the trade dollar volume. A high value of ILLIQ
means the stock is illiquid. This measure is computed from high-frequency
tick data over 15 minute intervals and is averaged as a daily measure.
Turnover is measured as the log of daily trading volume, scaled by the number
of shares outstanding.
CAR: CAR is cumulative abnormal return that can be exploited to examine
stock price reactions to informed trading around Super Bowl advertising
events. The market return is defined as the return on the CRSP equal-
weighted stock index. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i over period





where eit = rit− rmt, and rit and rmt are the stock returns for firm i and the
market, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Group A Group B
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Panel 1
Illiquidity 0.00 0.02 3815 0.00 0.01 3722
PIN 0.24 0.16 3646 0.23 0.16 3538
No.trades 0.02 0.07 3770 0.04 0.11 3677
Trade size 1.51 2.59 3770 1.49 2.69 3677
Trade volume $ 83.40 206.09 3770 64.82 136.33 3677
Turnover 0.00 0.02 3495 0.00 0.01 3166
Price 96.64 207.94 3817 56.22 65.60 3722
Panel 2
Total Asset 70.71 70.12 77 123.31 198.82 70
Capital (size) 456.44 1125.13 77 305.43 1030.14 70
Ad expense 0.06 0.05 70 0.07 0.06 59
BM ratio 0.40 0.54 73 0.30 0.34 68
Leverage 0.07 0.07 77 0.05 0.06 70
No. Analyst 18.11 8.27 70 21.42 8.04 71
Volatility 5.03 13.07 81 2.88 4.94 81
Instown perc 0.69 0.21 68 0.75 0.21 72
Table3. 2
The table 3.2 shows summary statistics for advertised firms where group A
contains firms whose names are recognizable from the content of advertis-
ing and group B contains firms whose names are not recognizable from the
content of advertising.
Panel 1 reports summary statistics for variables measured daily and panel 2
reports summary statistics for variables measured annually.
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3.6.6 Event Effect Around Super Bowl Commercials:
T-tests and Non-parametric Tests
I hypothesize that Super Bowl Commercials can increase the level of informed
trading and reduce the information efficiency in financial markets, and that
this effect is stronger for firms whose names are readily identifiable from the
contents of advertising.
I compute PIN and other information efficiency measures during the event
window and then make comparisons with other non-event time periods. I
also classify the samples into two groups according to whether firm names are
recognizable from the content of advertising. Then I make my comparisons
separately for each group. As not all of the variables are normally distributed,
I use both t-tests and non-parametric tests.
3.6.7 Regression Methodology
Three regressions are employed in this part: an event impact test, a difference
in differences analysis, and a price discovery analysis.
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3.6.8 Advertising and Information Asymmetry: Event
Effect Regressions
First, I apply cross-sectional regressions to my measures of information asym-
metry and information efficiency regressed against an event dummy, investor
trading characteristics, and other control variables. The purpose of this
approach is to test the event impact and examine the relationship between
advertising and firms’ information environment around the Super Bowl Com-
mercials events. I regress my dependent variables on an event dummy vari-
able which equals one if a firm’s name can be recognized from the content
of the advertising and zero otherwise. The event’s impact is captured by the
coefficient of the dependent variable relative to the event dummy.
The regression equation is:
Y =β0 + β1EventDummy + β2Turnover + β3Imbalance
+ β4BMratio+ β5Size+ ε
where the event dummy equals one if a firm’s name can be recognized from
the content of advertising and zero otherwise, turnover is the share turnover,
Imbalance is the buy-sell order imbalance, BMratio is the log book-to-market
ratio, and Size is the log market capitalization of the advertised firm. The
dependent variable in this regression model is one of PIN , AutocorrelFactor,
StdevFactor, or Delay.
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3.6.9 Difference in Differences Regressions on Infor-
mation Environment, Returns, and Liquidity
To investigate whether advertising events change financial market outcomes
such as information asymmetry, information efficiency, liquidity, and returns,
I use the panel data difference in differences regressions with firm and year
fixed effects.
In the first group of regressions, the treatment dummy is equal to 1 if ad-
vertised firms’ names are recognizable from the content of advertising and 0
otherwise. In the second group of regressions, the treatment dummy is equal
to 1 for advertised firms and 0 for firms from the matched sample. The time
dummy is equal to 1 if the day is the post-event Monday.
The regression model is:
yit = βi + β1time+ β2treated+ β3time ∗ treated+ β4control + εit.
Advertising’s impact on financial market outcomes is measured by the coef-
ficients β1, β2, and β3, but especially β3.
All regressions include firm fixed effects to control for firm specific variations
in information asymmetry and my information efficiency measures. I also
include year fixed effects in the regressions to control for potential time trends
in the changes in information asymmetry and efficiency.
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3.6.10 Price Discovery Analysis: Return and Informa-
tion Asymmetry Resulting from Advertising
To explain changes in short-run stock returns and to investigate the speed
with which asymmetric information results from advertising being incorpo-
rated into stock prices. I conduct asset pricing tests like those employed
by Easley et al. (2002) and Duarte and Young (2009). These tests examine
whether the asymmetric information after advertising is priced by markets.
The adjusted Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression is:
rit+1 = β0 + β1PINit + β2Illiquidityit + β3BMit + β4Sizeit + εit+1,
where rit+1 is the monthly stock return of firm i in excess of market return
at time t + 1, Illiquidity is the Amihud illiquidity measure, BM is the log
book-to-market ratio of the firm, and Size is the log market capitalization.
The coefficient β1 measures the speed with which asymmetric information
is incorporated into prices by markets. I hypothesize that advertising can
increase informed trading, and that this can explain short run fluctuations
in stock returns. Hence, I expect a positive coefficient here.
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3.7 Results
3.7.1 T-test and Non-parametric Test Results
Table 3.3 illustrates the T-test results for securities’ returns, PIN, and my
information efficiency metrics within the event window relative to a control
period, where group A contains firms whose name is recognizable from the
advertising content I study and group B contains other advertised firms.
Table 3.3: T-test Results: Information Environment and Stock Returns
Group A Group B
Event Non-event Difference Event Non-event Difference
Return -.0113 .005 -.0117 ∗∗∗ -.0112 .0001 -.0113∗∗∗
PIN .2857 .2398 .0458 ∗∗∗ .1920 .2267 -.0347∗
AutocorrelFactor .2292 -.0313 .2605 ∗∗ -.0888 .0302 -.1191
StdevFactor .2885 .0231 .2654 ∗∗ .2610 -.0362 .2522∗∗
Delay .9450 .9077 .0374 ∗ .0645 .0775 -.0130
To assess the effect of product market advertising on returns, informed trad-
ing, and information efficiency in financial markets, I examine the significance
of differences in the event/non-event means, using a two-tailed test. While
the abnormal returns decrease during the event window, my information
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asymmetry measure (PIN) and information efficiency measures (autocorre-
lation factor, standard deviation factor, and delay) all increase. This implies
greater information asymmetry and inefficiency, and lower abnormal returns.
A drop in abnormal returns on the post-event Monday indicates that any
advertising-induced buyers suffer a loss in trading the stocks of advertised
firms. The increase in PIN indicates that there is more informed trading in
the financial markets, which is significantly greater for samples from group
A. I also find a statistically significant increase in all measures of informa-
tion efficiency, which suggests a greater inefficiency overall. This effect is
also significantly greater for samples from group A. The effect of advertis-
ing on financial markets outcomes is more pronounced for stocks from firms
with whose names are readily identifiable from the content of the advertis-
ing. This means advertising that is more recognizable to investors has a
larger impact. The difference is more statistically significant for firms whose
names are recognizable from the content of advertising, allowing me to reject
the hypotheses that advertising has a positive impact on stock returns and
that advertising reduces information asymmetry, and improves information
efficiency in the financial markets.
The followed table contains both t-tests and the non-parametric tests for
robustness.
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T-test and Non-parameter test Results: Information Environment and
Stock Returns
Means Medians
Non-event Event p Non-event Event p
Group A
Return .0003 -.0116 0.0000 .0005 -.0092 0.0000
PIN .2419 .2918 0.0119 .1902 .2492 0.0083
AutocorrelFactor -.0244 .2301 0.0288 -.1926 .0065 0.2334
StdDevFactor .0279 .3026 0.0366 -.2748 -.2066 0.0647
Delay .9083 .9233 0.2711 .9534 .9646 0.3424
Group B
Return .0001 -.0116 0.0000 .0005 -.0086 0.0000
PIN .2269 .1923 0.0781 .1804 .1712 0.1553
AutocorrelFactor .0358 -.1322 0.1930 -.1761 -.3601 0.0770
StdDevFactor -.0581 .1393 0.0619 -.2884 -.1832 0.0371
Delay .9046 .9238 0.1843 .9508 .9636 0.2693
Matched Samples
Return .0006 -.0081 0.0000 .0004 -.0071 0.0000
PIN .2587 .2639 0.7397 .1953 .1908 0.5319
AutocorrelFactor -.0044 .0116 0.8088 -.3178 -.2515 0.8153
StdDevFactor .0005 -.0511 0.4366 -.3426 -.3106 0.9600
Delay .9058 .9066 0.9256 .9538 .9465 0.7993
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The table 3.4 illustrates t-test for the trading variable metrics in the event
window relative to the control period, where group A contains firms whose
names are recognizable from the content of advertising and where group
B contains other advertised firms. N trades01 is the number of trades of
group01. Val sum01 is the dollar trading volume of group01. BSratio01 is
the buy-sell imbalance of group01. These variables are analogous for the
remaining two groups (group 02 and group 03). Group 01 includes all trades
whose size is below $2,000. Group 02 includes all trades whose size is between
$2,000 and $30,000. Group 03 includes all trades whose size is larger than
$30,000.
Table 3.4 reports the means differences across event and non-event around
the Super Bowl Commercials, and the significance of any differences using
two-tailed tests. According to Campbell et al. (2009), I classify all trades into
3 bins of different size: below $2,000 (group01), between $2,000 and $30,000
(group02), and larger than $30,000 (group03).
The difference is more statistically significant for firms from group A, which
means the effect of advertising is more pronounced for firms whose names
are recognizable from the content of advertising. The buy-sell imbalance for
group 03 drops from 0.0116 during the non-event period to -0.1550 on the
post-event Monday. This change is not only statistically significant at the 1%
level but also economically significant, as the change in buy-sell imbalance on
the post-event Monday is greater than ten times (1,423%) its value during the
non-event period. This change, along with the increased number of trades
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Table 3.4: T-test Results: Trades
Group A Group B
Event Non-event Difference Event Non-event Difference
N trades01 1878.6 1251.0 627.6 ∗ 1155.2 880.8 274.4
Val sum01 1853 1175 678 ∗∗ 1029 845 184
BSratio01 -.0750 -.0101 -.0649 ∗ -.0947 .0025 -.0971∗∗∗
N trades02 4585.9 3418.5 1167.4 ∗∗ 4962.9 4049.9 913.0∗
Val sum02 38661 29055 9607 ∗∗ 39750 32808 6942
BSratio02 -.0488 -.0556 .0132 ∗∗ -.0598 -.0188 -.0410∗
N trades03 853.7 648.0 205.7 485.1 477.1 8.009
Val sum03 76028 54430 21588 32843 33531 687
BSratio03 -.1550 .0116 -.1666 ∗∗∗ -.1165 -.0075 -.1090∗
and trading volume, suggests that there are more large size trades on the
post-event Monday and that most of them are sell orders.
These results indicate that the effect of advertising on the overall order im-
balance is insignificant, however, for trades with size larger than $30,000,
the effect of advertising on the volume of sells is greater than the effect of
advertising on the volume of buys.
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The results in this table allow me to infer the direction of trade from insti-
tutional investors. Campbell et al. (2009) document that trades with size
below $2,000 or above $30,000 are likely consistent with the direction of in-
stitutional orders, while trades sized between $2,000 and $30,000 likely have
an opposite direction to the institutional orders.
Thus, it is possible that Super Bowl advertising not only affects individual in-
vestors but also institutional investors. There are more institutional investors
involved in trading stocks from advertised firms, but they sell significantly
more than they buy. I analyze trade volumes and order imbalance and show
that the effect of Super Bowl advertising on the volume of sells is greater
than it is on the volume of buys for the large size order group. These results
indicate that informed or institutional investors strategically time their sell
trades to occur on predicted imminent noise trading. The way that informed
investor interact with uninformed traders exacerbates the level of informed
trading or information asymmetry in the financial markets.
The following table contains both t-tests and non-parametric tests for adver-
tised firms and a matched sample.
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T-test and Non-parameter test results: Trades (Group A)
Means Medians
Non-event Event p Non-event Event p
Group A
N trades01 1,278 1,922 0.0689 481.5 844 0.1496
Siz sum01 121,507 148,303 0.6119 6,773 11,770 0.2206
Val sum01 1177000 1879422 0.0314 425,146 558,923 0.1436
BS01 -.0099 -.0639 0.1132 -.004 -.0897 0.1182
N trades02 3,506 4,737 0.0218 2,056 2,505 0.3445
Siz sum02 784,248 948,673 0.2933 360,879 440,574 0.2783
Val sum02 2.98e+07 4.00e+07 0.0181 1.77e+07 2.32e+07 0.3811
BS02 -.0059 -.0544 0.0233 -.0054 -.0469 0.0732
N trades03 670.9 886.1 0.3283 170 161 0.9459
Siz sum03 706,763 679,560 0.8617 306,554 305,000 0.7812
Val sum03 5.57e+07 7.80e+07 0.3076 1.61e+07 1.81e+07 0.9367
BS03 .0068 -.1615 0.0026 .0005 -.1353 0.0010
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T-test and Non-parameter test results: Trades (Group B)
Means Medians
Non-event Event p Non-event Event p
Group B
N trades01 858.2 1,154 0.1865 352.5 488.5 0.1557
Siz sum01 38,697 43,119 0.8321 5,836 10,063 0.1724
Val sum01 827,496 1032567 0.4076 263,789 351,591 0.1409
BS01 .001 -.0814 0.0327 -.0009 -.088 0.0192
N trades02 4,208 5,155 0.0940 2,781 3,122 0.2384
Siz sum02 812,419 930,000 0.4757 484,081 566,645 0.2360
Val sum02 3.36e+07 4.10e+07 0.1937 2.09e+07 2.28e+07 0.2671
BS02 -.0189 -.0614 0.0783 -.0214 -.0554 0.0182
N trades03 320.8 320.9 0.9994 97 100 0.7106
Siz sum03 642,683 652,755 0.9571 158,457 177,116 0.8465
Val sum03 2.34e+07 2.30e+07 0.9430 7564300 7058740 0.8354
BS03 -.0109 -.1007 0.1266 -.0258 -.0801 0.1081
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T-test and Non-parameter test results: Trades (Match Samples)
Means Medians
Non-event Event p Non-event Event p
Matched Samples
N trades01 382.7 388.6 0.9403 63 76 0.2943
Siz sum01 43,336 43,914 0.9703 2,093 2,876 0.2506
Val sum01 450,114 422,375 0.8088 53,601 60,715 0.2502
BS01 -.0170 -.0364 0.5388 -.0072 -.0224 0.8273
N trades02 654.1 685.9 0.7503 170.5 152 0.9258
Siz sum02 138,722 141,849 0.9284 29,567 25,018 0.9356
Val sum02 4440081 4595892 0.8828 783,571 647,776 0.8584
BS02 -.018 -.0395 0.4239 -.0142 -.0211 0.3736
N trades03 35.99 34.45 0.9239 3 3 0.7872
Siz sum03 58,427 45,357 0.5486 10,905 10,744 0.8366
Val sum03 2628325 2268128 0.7780 328,951 343,056 0.9803
BS03 .0199 -.2099 0.0004 .0284 -.3114 0.0006
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The table 3.5 illustrates t-tests for my liquidity metrics in the event window
relative to the control period, where group A contains firms whose names are
recognizable from the content of advertising and group B contains other ad-
vertised firms. Illiquidity is the intra-day version of Amihud (2002) illiquidity
ratio. Price impact is the Kyle (1985) lamda. Rspread is the realized bid-
ask spread. Espread is the effective bid-ask spread. Qspread is the quoted
bid-ask spread.
Table 3.5: T-test Results: Liquidity
Group A Group B
Event Non-event Difference Event Non-event Difference
Illiquidity 169.5 650.8 -481.2 80.087 101.1 20.98
Price impact 26.356 24.030 2.326 20.590 19.912 0.677
Rspread -3.356 1.805 -5.161 -3.194 -0.240 -2.954
Espread 2.109 2.432 -3.230 1.6245 1.833 -.208
Qspread 2.084 2.219 -.1355 1.866 2.222 -.356
This table reports my findings for liquidity. I show that all of my liquid-
ity measures do not statistically significantly increase after an advertising
event. This is inconsistent with some prior research. For example, Grullon
et al. (2004) find that product market advertising results in an increase in
trading activity, and increased trading activity lowers adverse select costs
and improves liquidity. However, their finding is based on annual advertising
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expenditures and annualized low frequency liquidity measures. Advertising
might have long-run effects on stock liquidity as shown in Grullon et al.
(2004). However, in the short-run, advertising might not be linked with
improved liquidity. Focke et al. (2018) find that liquidity improves only to
a very minimal extent after a small increase in noise trading. Moreover,
liquidity could also decrease due to the attention-induced order imbalance.
For example, Barber and Odean (2007) find increased inventory holding cost
decreases liquidity. As is shown in the above table, most of the liquidity mea-
sures for Group A deteriorate, fall which, though not statistically significant,
are economically significant. I also show liquidity changes around the Super
Bowl advertising events by using the difference in differences models in table
3.10. These indicate that advertised firms experience a drop in liquidity. My
results might be explained by advertising induced changes in order imbalance
among large size orders, which can potentially offset any improved liquidity
due to attention-driven noise trading.
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3.7.2 Regression Results
The table 3.6 shows the results of cross-sectional regressions of PIN on an
event dummy, investors’ trading activity variables, and other control vari-
ables. The event day is defined as the post-event Monday.
The purpose of this regression is to test the event effect on PIN and explain
the cross-sectional variations in PIN values I computed. The event effect is
captured by the event effect dummy which is equal to one if the company is
identifiable from the advertising content and zero otherwise.
The coefficient of the event effect dummy on PIN is positive and signifi-
cant, which means firms whose names are identifiable form the content of
advertising have higher PIN levels than other firms.
I find a strong positive relationship between PIN and illiquidity, which sug-
gests that events which are associated with increased information asymmetry
or informed trading are also related to reduced stock liquidity. This may po-
tentially be explained by the changed buy-sell imbalance I observe among
large size orders following advertising events.
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Ownership concentration 0.6842 0.6495
(1.4079) (1.3298)




BM ratio −0.0205 −0.0291
(−0.4225) (−0.5984)
Advertising expense −0.9051 −0.8216
(−1.6243) (−1.4923)






adj. R2 0.2769 0.2732
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Regression Results: Panel Data Event Effect Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
PIN PIN PIN
Tradesize −0.0756∗∗∗ −0.0769∗∗∗ −0.0661∗∗∗
(−15.1474) (−11.2754) (−6.6563)
Turnover 0.9564 2.5574∗∗∗ −13.2411∗
(1.2515) (3.1201) (−1.7432)
Volatility −0.0022∗∗ −0.0034∗∗ −0.0002
(−2.0012) (−2.1720) (−0.1235)
Illiquidity −0.4373∗∗ −0.5687∗∗ 8.8065∗
(−2.0398) (−2.3743) (1.8718)
Ownership concentration 0.5004∗∗∗ 0.4329 0.5530∗∗∗
(3.7761) (1.5532) (3.1287)
NO. of analyst 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(9.3277) (9.5671) (3.1169)
Leverage 0.2703∗∗∗ 0.2500∗∗ 0.2476
(3.0960) (2.4314) (1.1342)
BM ratio 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.0008
(5.0337) (6.3773) (0.0886)




cons 0.7018∗∗∗ 0.8654∗∗∗ 0.4763∗∗∗
(11.5037) (10.2546) (4.4706)
N 1027 565 462
R2 0.2774 0.3601 0.1995
adj. R2 0.2695 0.3485 0.1817
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7 shows the results from panel data regressions of PIN on my event
dummy, investor trading activity variables, and other control variables. The
data cover the (t-10, t+10) time period.
The first column of this table reports the results of regressions for all adver-
tised firms. The second column reports the results of regressions for firms
whose names are readily identifiable from the content of advertising, and the
third column is for other firms.
I run these regressions of PIN on advertising events and other key variables.
In column 1, I find a positive and significant impact of advertising events on
PIN, suggesting that advertising events precede increase in informed trading
and higher information asymmetry. In columns 2 and 3, I repeat the same
regression as in column 1 but exclude the event dummy. I find a positive
relationship between PIN and turnover, which is measured as daily trad-
ing volume over shares outstanding. I find that the explanatory power, as
measured by R2, is higher in the subsample of firms whose names can be
recognizable from the content of advertising.
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Table 3.8: Regression Results: Information Environment Change for Adver-
tised Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PIN ACFactor StdevFactor Delay
Time
Treated −0.0134∗∗∗ 0.3846∗∗∗ 0.0327 0.0036
(−4.4440) (13.9667) (1.4451) (1.0152)
Time·Treated 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.1817∗∗∗ 0.1970∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗
(4.2975) (10.8119) (11.6674) (8.8384)
cons 0.2607∗∗∗ 0.4662∗∗∗ 0.0691 0.9041∗∗∗
(28.9394) (9.7382) (1.6149) (95.8330)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year Dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Cluster Y es Y es Y es Y es
N 9975 9976 9976 9569
R2 0.2746 0.0659 0.1392 0.0054
adj. R2 0.2731 0.0640 0.1374 0.0033
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table shows difference in differences regression results for advertised
firms relative to a matched sample. The dependent variables are information
asymmetry and information efficiency variables including PIN, autocorrela-
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tion factor, standard deviation factor, and delay. Time is a dummy variable
that is equal to one if the date is after the Super Bowl advertising event,
and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
firm has run an advertising commercial at the Super Bowl, and zero if the
firm belongs to propensity score matched sample. The effect of advertis-
ing on information asymmetry and information efficiency can be assessed by
the coefficient on Time·Treated. All four of these coefficient estimates are
positive and highly statistically significant (at 1% level), showing that Su-
per Bowl commercial advertising exacerbates informed trading and reduces
market information efficiency.
96
CHAPTER 3. ADVERTISING’S FINANCIAL MARKET OUTCOMES
Table 3.9: Regression Results: Information Environment Change for (Rec-
ognizable) Advertised Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PIN ACFactor StdevFactor Delay
Time
Treated 0.5659∗∗∗ −0.1264∗∗∗ 0.1098∗∗∗ 0.0026
(3.4672) (−4.5079) (6.1345) (0.5342)
Time·Treated 0.4539∗∗∗ 0.2044∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0171∗∗∗
(27.7268) (2.5136) (0.0746) (4.5927)
cons −2.0853∗∗∗ −0.160 −0.2700∗∗ 0.9101∗∗∗
(−28.9105) (−0.5659) (−2.5117) (53.1650)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year Dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Cluster Y es Y es Y es Y es
N 4209 4649 4883 4708
R2 0.4370 0.0246 0.1915 0.0119
adj. R2 0.4326 0.0247 0.1884 0.0121
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.9 shows the results of panel data difference in differences regressions
of my financial market reaction variables on an event dummy and firm-level
control variables with firm and year fixed effects. I run these regressions to
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investigate the difference in differences for advertised firms whose names are
recognizable from the content of their advertising relative to other adver-
tised firms whose names are not similarly recognizable. The data cover the
(t-30, t+30) time period. The dependent variables again capture informa-
tion asymmetry and information efficiency, including PIN, autocorrelation
factor, standard deviation factor, and delay. Time is a dummy variable that
equals one if the date is after the Super Bowl advertising event and zero
otherwise. Treated is a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has
run commercial advertising at the Super Bowl and its name is recognizable
from content of its advertising and zero if it is not. The effect of advertis-
ing on information asymmetry and information efficiency can be assessed by
the coefficient on Time·Treated. All three coefficient estimates are positive
and highly statistically significant at the 1% level, again showing that Super
Bowl advertising exacerbates informed trading and reduces the information
efficiency of the market. These results provide evidence that advertising’s im-
pact is more pronounced for stocks from firms whose names are identifiable
from the content of their advertising.
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Figure 3.1: Parallel Trend Test: PIN
This graph reports the results of a parallel trend test for my difference in
differences regressions, where B3 denotes 3 days before T0 and A1 denotes
1 day after T0. This figure shows informed trading increases significantly on
the Monday after a Super Bowl advertising event.
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Figure 3.2: Parallel Trend Test: Autocorrelation Factor
This graph reports the results of a parallel trend test for my difference in
differences regressions, where B3 denotes 3 days before T0 and A1 denotes 1
day after T0. This figure shows Autocorrelation Factor increases significantly
on the Monday after a Super Bowl advertising event, which indicates that
the market is more inefficient.
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Figure 3.3: Parallel Trend Test: Standard Deviation Factor
This graph reports the results of a parallel trend test from difference in differ-
ences regressions, where B3 denotes 3 days before T0 and A1 denotes 1 day
after T0. This figure shows Standard Deviation Factor increases significantly
on the Monday after a Super Bowl advertising event, which indicates that
the market is more inefficient.
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Firm Controls Y es Y es
Fixed effects Y es Y es
Year Dummies Y es Y es
Cluster Y es Y es
N 10271 10119
R2 0.0012 0.1064
adj. R2 −0.0008 0.1045
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The table 3.10 shows the results of panel data difference in differences regres-
sion of my financial market reaction variables on event dummy and firm-level
control variables with firm and year fixed effects. I run this regression to in-
vestigate the difference in differences for firms that run advertising campaigns
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during the Super Bowl Game relative to firms from a matched sample. The
data cover the (t-30, t+30) time period. The dependent variables are cu-
mulative abnormal returns and stock illiquidity. Time is a dummy variable
that equals one if the date is after the Super Bowl advertising event and
zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy variable that equals one is the firm has
run advertising at the Super Bowl and zero if the firm is from a matched
sample. The effect of advertising on returns and iliquidity can be assessed
by the coefficient on Time·Treated. Both of the coefficient estimates are neg-
ative and highly statistically significant at the 1% level, showing that firms
which run advertising campaigns during Super Bowl experience reductions
in their stock returns. However, the adjusted R2 for the first regression is
negative, indicating an insignificant impact of advertising events on abnor-
mal returns. These firms also exhibit an improved stock liquidity on the post
event Monday, but their stock liquidity deteriorates after that. I show this
by the parallel trend test for illiquidity.
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Figure 3.4: Parallel Trend Test: Illiquidity
This graph reports the results of a parallel trend test for my difference in
differences regressions, where B3 denotes 3 days before T0 and A1 denotes 1
day after T0. This figure shows that stock illiquidity increases significantly
after a Super Bowl advertising event, which indicates that advertised firms’
securities experience liquidity problems in the financial markets after the
advertising events.
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Table 3.11: Regression Results: Fama-Mecbeth Regressions
(Full Sample) (Group A) (Group B)
CAR CAR CAR
PIN 0.4441 −11.7583∗ 16.2282∗
(0.0833) (−1.6896) (1.7986)
Illiquidity −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0162∗∗
(−3.4386) (−2.7163) (−2.5870)
BM 0.6584 1.0502 0.8399
(0.8141) (0.9592) (0.6821)
Size −0.1144 0.0798 −0.9370
(−0.3728) (0.2198) (−1.6081)
cons 0.1710 3.4110 0.3362
(0.0818) (1.1483) (0.1045)
N 237 136 101
R2 0.0503 0.0855 0.1173
adj. R2 0.0339 0.0575 0.0805
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table reports modified Fama-Mecbeth regression results. I run these re-
gressions to analyze whether informed trading accounts for the decline in firm
stock returns after a Super Bowl advertising event, where group A contains
firms whose names are recognizable from the content of their advertising and
group B contains other advertised firms. I find a highly negative impact of
informed trading on abnormal accumulated returns for firms from group A.
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This means advertising’s effect is more pronounced for firms whose names
are recognizable from the content of their advertising. The effect is statis-
tically significant at the 10% level and the coefficient is also economically
significant.
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3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies how advertising affects financial market outcomes. I ex-
ploit Super Bowl Commercials as notable events to examine how advertising
influences the trading behavior of market participants and the consequential
market implications , especially for information asymmetry and information
efficiency. I find that the post-event Monday is associated with reduced
returns, informational inefficiency, and increased informed trading. These
effects are more pronounced for firms whose names are recognizable from
the content of their advertising. These firms also experience a significant
decrease in their buy-sell imbalance for large size orders that are defined as
order values greater than $30,000. This indicates there are more large sell
orders after an advertising event, likely submitted by institutional investors.
The results from difference in differences regressions examining the short run
effect of advertising on liquidity indicate that advertised firms experience a
decrease in stock liquidity. Although advertising might have long-term effect
on liquidity, I show that this is not necessarily linked to improved liquidity
directly following an advertising event. The results from difference in differ-
ences regressions provide further evidence that advertising may exacerbate
informed trading and reduce information efficiency, especially for firms whose
names are recognizable from the content of advertising.
These findings might be attributable to advertising induced trading. That
is, informed investors may be strategically timing their trades to occur or
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front-run when they anticipate that their will be more attention-driven noise
trading from retail investors. Informed investors might be able to anticipate
uninformed traders after an advertising event. With the wide spread use of
algorithmic trading technology, they can trade on predicted short-run market
changes. The way that informed investors interact with uninformed traders
after the Super Bowl might exacerbate information asymmetry among them
and reduce market information efficiency.
This research shows empirically that advertising can increase information
asymmetry among investors in financial markets, which is in contrast to
the prior literature that advertising can reduce information asymmetry in
financial markets. There are two reasons may help to explain the difference.
First, the information asymmetry in the financial markets is unobservable,
so I use the probability of informed trading to proxy it. That measure reflect
the information asymmetry among informed and uninformed investors, while
some prior studies use information asymmetry to measure the information
gap between insiders and investors. Advertising can at least make the firms’
name better known for investors and therefore reduce the information asym-
metry between insiders and investors. However, it may also mislead some
uninformed investors to bid up the stock prices and suffer a loss in trading
with more informed investors, which means that advertising increase the in-
formation asymmetry between informed investors and uninformed investors.
Second, in this study I use the high-frequency intra-day trading data to in-
vestigate the information asymmetry and information efficiency at the micro
level, while most of the prior research rely on the low frequency data.
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My findings have important implications for the literature on financial market
effects of marketing endeavor’s. In particular, my findings confirm that adver-
tising may not inflate short-run stock prices and improve liquidity. Moreover,
my results uncover the potential risks in trading the attention-grabbing se-
curities. This means some uninformed retail investors may suffer losses when
trading stocks of the advertised firms.
While advertising is widely regarded as some kind of public information, I
find advertising does not help to make financial markets more informationally
efficient. Moreover, advertising events appear to be associated with short-run
market inefficiency.
My findings also shed light on the literature which relies on using high-
frequency data to analyze advertising’s short-run financial market impacts.
I add to this body of work since advertising’s impacts are supposedly mainly
short-term, and high frequency data allows me to better capture any potential
impacts.
My results highlight the importance of interactions among institutional and
individual investors after advertising events. The increased large sell or-
ders I document appear at the same time as informed trading increases and
information efficiency decreases. This suggests such interactions could be
important. I look forward to reading more studies which focus on this area.
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This study examines the impact of advertising on firm financial market out-
comes. In particular, I focus on outcomes related to firms’ information en-
vironment, including information asymmetry and information efficiency, and
on the trading behavior of different market participants, as well as for firms’
short-run stock returns and liquidity.
Using an adjusted Glosten-Milgrom model, I show that theoretically, adver-
tising can increase information asymmetry in financial markets.
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Based on the results from this theoretical model, I develop the hypothesis
that advertising may facilitate informed trading in financial markets. I use
an event study research method to track the changes in informed trading
around the event windows. Using data on Super Bowl Commercials and high
frequency intra-day trading data, I show that advertising increases informed
trading of stocks whose names are readily identifiable from the contents of
their adverting.
This research shows theoretically and empirically that advertising can in-
crease information asymmetry among investors in financial markets, which
is in contrast to the prior literature that advertising can reduce information
asymmetry in financial markets. There are two reasons may help to explain
the difference. First, the information asymmetry in the financial markets is
unobservable, so I use the probability of informed trading to proxy it. That
measure reflect the information asymmetry among informed and uninformed
investors, while some prior studies use information asymmetry to measure
the information gap between insiders and investors. Advertising can at least
make the firms’ name better known for investors and therefore reduce the
information asymmetry between insiders and investors. However, it may also
mislead some uninformed investors to bid up the stock prices and suffer a
loss in trading with more informed investors, which means that advertising
increase the information asymmetry between informed investors and unin-
formed investors. Second, in this study I use the high-frequency intra-day
trading data to investigate the information asymmetry and information ef-




Furthermore, I investigate whether advertising can improve stocks’ informa-
tion efficiency, which measures the speed with which the market impounds
information into prices. Analyses of Super Bowl Commercials paired with
the high frequency intraday trading data around game days between 2008
and 2018 reveal that advertised firms whose names are readily identifiable
from the contents of their advertising experience decreased information effi-
ciency of the market, accompanied by an increase in informed trading and a
decrease in cumulative abnormal returns around the advertising event win-
dows. These results are robust for different proxies of information efficiency.
Moreover, I study the magnitude and direction of trading from informed in-
vestors, the institutional investors. I examine the hypothesis that advertising
will result in more sell orders from institutional investors. Using the t-tests
and non-parameter tests applied to the buy-sell imbalance of large size or-
ders, I find that there is a reduced buy-sell imbalance for large size orders
on the day after an advertising event for firms whose names are recognizable
from the content of advertising. This result indicates institutional investors
sell more than they buy after an advertising event.
I also investigate advertising’s impact on short-run returns and stock liquid-
ity. Using results from t-tests and non-parametric tests, I show that adver-
tised firms exhibit declining cumulative abnormal returns. Modified Fama-
Mecbeth regressions suggest that the lower cumulative abnormal returns are
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correlated with increased informed trading. I also find stocks liquidity de-
creases after advertising events. This result in contrast with early studies
suggesting that advertising improves stock liquidity because of the increased
retail investor’s trading activity.
My study provides evidence on the relationship between firm advertising and
financial markets information environment, and in particular on informed
trading and the level of information efficiency after advertising is broadcast.
I also shed light on the literature examining advertising’s impact on short-run
abnormal returns, stock liquidity, and institutional investors’ behavior.
4.2 Limitation
This research also has some limitations owing to the limited time to conduct
it and restricted access to databases.
In the theoretical section, I only use a modified Golsten-Milgrom model to il-
lustrate how advertising changes the information asymmetry among investors
in financial markets. However, recently, the PIN model has become more
widely used and accepted than the Glosten-Milgrom model. If I use both the
PIN model and Glosten-Milgrom model, the results will be more robust. In
the modified Glosten-Milgrom model, I show that advertising can increase
information asymmetry with both a two-step and three-step model. How-
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ever, I don’t illustrate how information asymmetry goes back to a normal
level in the long-run, and this is also important to complete the story about
changes in information asymmetry resulting from advertising.
The main research method used in empirics is the event study method. This
is a compromise since I do not have access to an appropriate advertising
database. The event study method allows me to investigate investors’ re-
actions and financial market outcomes in a quasi-experimental setting, in
which various information proxies, trade variables, and liquidity measures
are tracked around a time window surrounding the focal advertising events.
However, the empirical analyses related to the event study method are lim-
ited. I can only rely on t-tests and difference in differences models to test
the event effect. Another limitation resulting from the event study method is
sample size. My initial advertising sample is selected from advertising video
of Super Bowl Commercials over the 2008 to 2018 period. It is composed of
162 firm-events, where 81 firms have recognizable advertisement and other
81 firms cannot be readily identified from their advertising. The sample size
becomes very small. It would be nice to add some analyses with larger data
sets (that are potentially more noisy) to rule out that the findings are not an
artifact of the particular sports event/sample. Moreover, as my sample size
is limited, I cannot do further analyses about firms from different industries.
The events of interest in this research is the Super Bowl Commercial. The
Super Bowl is on Sunday, which undermines the importance of using high




This study also has some endogeneity problems. For example, firms who
choose to advertise on Super Bowl also attach great importance to firm im-
ages during other times, which could attract both institutional and retail
investors. The using of matched sample from the propensity score match-
ing (PSM) is a solution to this problem, however, it still has some selection
bias. That is, the PSM can only match advertising firms and non-advertising
firms on observed variables. PSM can only mitigate selection bias due to
observables. When advertising firms and non-advertising firms make their
advertising decisions based on factors that are not observable or not included
into the analysis, there are still differences between two groups of firms.
I show that advertising events are correlated with reduced abnormal returns,
and also find that advertising events do not have significant impacts on short
term stock liquidity, both findings which depart from prior studies. However,
I do not investigate these questions any further here.
4.3 Future Directions
With regards to future research, it would be promising if this thesis could be
extended into the following directions:
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Previous research about attention and stock returns has the endogeneity
problems because the attention-grabbing events often relate to the price fun-
damentals of the firm (Focke et al., 2018; Peress and Schmidt, 2019). The
Google trend and the Blomberg search intensity measures are two commonly
used measures of attention (Focke et al., 2018), however, both of them are
correlated with information about firm values. Advertising does not directly
contain value-based information but can capture audiences’ attention (Lou,
2014). So it would be very useful to exploit advertising as an instrument
when conducting 2SLS regressions to examine how attention affects stock
returns.
While Grullon et al. (2004) document advertising can increase stock liquid-
ity due to the increased noise trading, Focke et al. (2018) find advertising
does not have significant impact on stock liquidity. This inconsistency stems
from the difference in the frequency and measurement of liquidity. I find ad-
vertising events do not significantly affect stock liquidity on the post-event
Monday, however, advertised firms exhibit a decline in liquidity over the next
few days. In examining advertising’s impact on stock liquidity, I do not go
far enough, as the event study method has limitations in studying the long-
run effects. The daily advertising intensity data is available in the Kantar
database. By combining it with high frequency tick data, one can trace
daily changes of stock liquidity resulting from advertising. This could give




Advertising’s financial market effects vary from different industries (Joshi and
Hanssens, 2010a). For example, advertising’s spillover effects in the financial
markets are more likely to happen in the business to consumer industries
than the business to business industries. With daily advertising intensity
data, there should also be more samples available from a number of different
industries. Investigating of advertising’s impact on financial markets for
different industries is a potentially desirable future research direction.
Advertising affects individual investors more than it does institutional in-
vestors (Barber and Odean, 2000; Fehle et al., 2005; Joshi and Hanssens,
2010a). Individual investors are the net buyer of stocks from heavily ad-
vertised firms (Barber and Odean, 2007), and institutional investors are net
sellers. There is a possibility that cannot be ruled out that institutional in-
vestors might leave such heavily advertised firms. In-depth exploration of
how institutional investors behave before and after firms increase or decrease
their advertising expenditure would be very helpful.
The wide use of algorithmic trading is changing the mechanisms by which
information and signals affect the markets (Peress and Schmidt, 2019). Ma-
chine learning and deep learning are becoming more important in the fi-
nancial markets. Artificial intelligence plays a more important role in asset
pricing. I expect there will be more work on advertising’s financial market
outcomes under the umbrella of new trading technologies.
Finally, in response to the concerns about advertising’s side effects in the
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financial markets, I study advertising’s impact on information risk, infor-
mation efficiency, cumulative abnormal returns, and liquidity. Advertising
might affect stock price crash risk and liquidity risk as well, so it would be
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